Integrated Relationships: The Impact of European Integration on the Special Relationship, 1969-1973 by Pack, Benjamin Jared




Integrated Relationships: The Impact of European
Integration on the Special Relationship, 1969-1973
Benjamin Jared Pack
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd
Part of the International Relations Commons, and the United States History Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more information, please contact scholar@uark.edu, ccmiddle@uark.edu.
Recommended Citation
Pack, Benjamin Jared, "Integrated Relationships: The Impact of European Integration on the Special Relationship, 1969-1973" (2014).
























Integrated Relationships: The Impact of European Integration on the Special Relationship, 1969–
1973
 






A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 










Benjamin Jared Pack 
Freed-Hardeman University  
























Dr. Randall Woods     Dr. Benjamin Grob-Fitzgibbon  







The special relationship has long been a topic of interest to historians of US foreign 
relations. The general consensus has been that the years 1969–1973 were a low point for Anglo-
American relations, and have therefore been dismissed as largely insignificant. Rejecting this 
interpretation, this thesis contends that while certainly one of the lowest moments in the history 
of the special relationship, the Heath-Nixon relationship reveals much about the nature of the 
special relationship and America’s relations with its allies more broadly. Focusing on the 
question of European integration (and the corresponding British entry into the European 
Community in 1973) and its impact on the special relationship, this thesis contends that when 
European integration brought geopolitics and personality together in a totalizing question of the 
future of each state in the global Cold War, Anglo-American relations rapidly deteriorated. Yet, 
despite reaching a troubled state, the special relationship survived and now serves to illustrate a 
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In his famous Iron Curtain speech delivered in Fulton, Missouri on March 5, 1946, 
former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill proposed a “special relationship between the 
British Commonwealth and Empire and the United States of America.”1 Further explaining the 
scope of what he was suggesting, Churchill continued: 
Fraternal association requires not only the growing friendship and mutual understanding 
between our two vast but kindred systems of society, but the continuance of the intimate 
relations between our military advisers, leading to common study of potential dangers, 
the similarity of weapons and manuals of instructions, and to the interchange of officers 
and cadets at technical colleges. It should carry with it the continuance of the present 
facilities for mutual security by the joint use of all Naval and Air Force bases in the 
possession of either country all over the world. . . . There is however an important 
question we must ask ourselves. Would a special relationship between the United States 
and the British Commonwealth be inconsistent with our over-riding loyalties to the 
World Organization? I reply that, on the contrary, it is probably the only means by which 
that organization will achieve its full stature and strength.2 
 
Churchill’s words were well calculated and targeted at a people who were, for the first time, 
experiencing a newfound status as a global superpower. The mantle of leadership had fallen 
upon the United States, and Churchill’s call for a special relationship based upon a common 
heritage and shared goals for the post-war world resonated within them. Yet Churchill’s 
influence extended beyond the American people; he had caught the attention of the nation’s 
highest political figures and presented them with an opportunity to gain an essential ally in the 
coming struggle against communism. With such challenges ahead, Churchill’s vision for a world 
led by a strong Anglo-American force would soon become reality. 
                                                 
1 Winston Churchill, speech, Fulton, MO, March 5, 1946, 




 Before World War II, and, to an even greater extent, before World War I, relations 
between the United States and Great Britain had been notably cool. Considering the American 
rebellion against British colonialism, the War of 1812, the territorial disputes between the two 
powers over the Oregon territory and other boundaries, and the British aid to the Confederate 
States of America during the Civil War, it is no wonder that relations between the two nations 
were initially less than amicable. Yet, the challenges posed to the entire democratic world by the 
fascist, authoritarian regimes of Adolf Hitler, Benito Mussolini, and Emperor Hirohito united the 
Western powers around a common cause. Recognizing their interdependence upon one another, 
the United States and Great Britain developed a close relationship through the personal 
diplomacy of Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill. Having put the past behind them, the 
special relationship was born during World War II, and then solidified during the early days of 
the Cold War.3 Realizing the utility of a relationship such as Churchill described in the Iron 
Curtain speech, presidents from Franklin Roosevelt to George W. Bush have made the special 
relationship a pivotal instrument in the execution of foreign policy. 
For this very reason, the special relationship has attracted the interest of many historians 
seeking to understand why the relationship started, how it has evolved over the years, and what 
the long-term effectiveness of such a relationship is in a changing society. Since its emergence as 
an important tool of American foreign policy, historians have devoted time and effort to writing 
books and articles focused on these and other questions. Yet within the academic and historical 
discussions of the special relationship, there remains a noticeable gap. Great attention has been 
given to the special relationship as experienced between John F. Kennedy and Harold MacMillan 
                                                 
3 For more on the diplomacy between Roosevelt and Churchill, see David Reynolds, 
From Munich to Pearl Harbor: Roosevelt’s America and the Origins of the Second World War 
(Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2001). 
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from 1961–63 and between Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher from 1981–89. Despite the 
abundance of material written on these years, the intervening years have largely been overlooked, 
particularly in regard to the administrations of Richard Nixon (1969–1974) and his British 
equivalent Edward Heath (1970–74).  
For many years, the traditional view of Anglo-American relations during the Nixon-
Heath era has been that this time period represented the lowest and most insignificant point of 
the special relationship. Larger studies of the special relationship on the whole—such as Roger 
Louis and Headley Bull’s book The ‘Special Relationship:’ Anglo-American Relations since 
1945 (1986) and John Dumbrell’s A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations from the 
Cold War to Iraq (2006)—have regarded the Nixon years (1969–74) as the most difficult ones of 
the special relationship. Arguing that while Heath’s focus turned ever more European, Nixon’s 
focus (and more significantly, Kissinger’s focus) turned against European integration, many 
conclude that the two leaders reached what could be considered a personal and diplomatic 
impasse leading to an insignificant period. 
Recently, several European historians have attempted to reevaluate the Nixon-Heath 
years in the special relationship. This effort at new scholarship is most noticeable in three books 
written on the topic: Niklas Rossbach’s Heath, Nixon, and the Rebirth of the Special 
Relationship: Britain, the US, and the EC, 1969–74 (2009); Catherine Hynes’ The Year That 
Never Was: Heath, the Nixon Administration, and the Year of Europe (2009); and Andrew 
Scott’s Allies Apart: Heath, Nixon, and the Anglo-American Relationship (2011). Putting forth 
new arguments and analyzing recently available sources, Rossbach, Hynes, and Scott represent a 
positive trend in the study of this overlooked period. Their works remain the only published 
monographs on this time period, for the first time critically examining its significance and 
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relative importance to the special relationship on the whole. Yet despite the progress made in 
these three books, there remain notable interpretive and narrative gaps. None of the three authors 
ask the question about just how much impact European integration had upon the changing nature 
of the special relationship during this period, and for the largest part, the traditional assumption 
that the early 1970s marked a low point informs the dominant historical assessment.  
With these foundational studies in mind, this thesis will argue that the question of 
European integration (and the corresponding British entry into the European Community in 
1973) was a key issue in affecting a marked deterioration in the special relationship between the 
United States and Great Britain. This change in the relationship, however, was not merely the 
direct result of the Nixon administration’s policies, nor was it solely an effect of the Heath 
government’s priorities. The changes, which were already under way when each government 
came to power, partially resulted from the unique challenges faced by both sides as they tried to 
balance the special relationship with broader global and regional political aims. Despite this 
slight deterioration in close relations, however, the special relationship continued to exist; there 
was no fear of the special relationship ending, and regardless of setbacks and diminishing 
personal contact, a unique closeness between the two nations continued. Furthermore, I will 
demonstrate that this era in Anglo-American relations bears a profound significance as a 
paradigm for America’s management of its closest allies, particularly in times of uncertainty for 
U.S. global leadership. 
From this premise, I develop the argument as follows: the first chapter will discuss the 
background to the situation that Nixon and Heath found upon entering office. It will cover, 
broadly, 1945–1969, with an emphasis on the previous British attempts to enter the European 
Community and major moments in the development of the special relationship. Chapter two will 
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analyze the foreign policy goals outlined by Heath and Nixon, focusing on the challenges faced 
by each side in developing foreign policy priorities, with particular attention to their dialogue on 
the special relationship and its compatibility with European Integration. The next chapter will 
examine key events for American foreign relations during 1970–72. It will highlight the major 
foreign relations efforts undertaken by Nixon and Kissinger during this time period, paying 
special attention to their consideration of the special relationship and the impact of American 
actions on relations with Great Britain. The fourth chapter will cover the same years 1970–72 
from the British perspective. It will outline the steps taken by Great Britain to move toward entry 
into the EC and the sentiments surrounding British entry, particularly as evidenced through 
parliamentary debates. I will also examine the American responses to British activity during this 
period, comparing it to the responses by the major European states to Britain’s entry into the EC. 
Key in this transatlantic debate was the Europeans’ still widespread concern about American 
influence through its special ally. Once Britain entered the EC in 1973, the question of 
transatlantic relations had moved to a broader context, prompted by the famous “Year of Europe” 
speech by Henry Kissinger. Those pivotal moments are the subject of chapter five. My 
conclusions test the importance of those changes for the significance of the special relationship 
as an American foreign policy tool. What will hopefully emerge from this study is a more 
nuanced presentation of the special relationship from 1969–73 and a deeper understanding of the 




Setting the Stage for ’69 
 
From the onset of the Cold War, both the United States and Great Britain actively 
advocated grand strategies designed to promote the spread of democracy and stop the advance of 
communism. These grand strategies—most notably the American strategies of containment, 
massive retaliation, and flexible response—led to decisions that affected the perception of both 
states in the global cold war. Coordinated policy led many in Europe to view the British as an 
extension of American power, while American unilateralism often prompted many to view the 
United States as untrustworthy. Furthermore, the established precedents for action and existing 
system of policies placed limitations on a new leader each time the executive office changed 
hands. Before crafting new policies and charting a new course, a leader had to first be mindful of 
the current situation. Thus, the foreign policy environments that Richard Nixon and Edward 
Heath found themselves in upon entering office in 1969 and 1970, respectively, were not 
situations of their own choosing. Rather, they were the direct result of actions taken by their 
predecessors over the previous twenty years. These existing realities would have remarkable 
bearing on the future foreign policies of Heath and Nixon. 
European integration emerged from the rubble of World War II’s disastrous toll on the 
European continent. With their treasuries drained, their cities and towns devastated, and their 
people homeless and hungry, the Western European states appealed to the only viable source of 
aid—the United States. The American answer to this call for help was the Marshall Plan, first 
introduced by Secretary of State General George Marshall in a commencement address at 
Harvard University in the summer of 1947. In that address, Marshall noted that “Europe's 
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requirements for the next three or four years of foreign food and other essential products—
principally from America—are so much greater than her present ability to pay that she must have 
substantial additional help or face economic, social, and political deterioration of a very grave 
character.”4 Marshall’s plan for aid, however, was not to be one of American design and 
implementation. Rather, he went on to state, “It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this 
Government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet 
economically. This is the business of the Europeans. The initiative, I think, must come from 
Europe.”5 Thus for Marshall, the key to successful economic recovery was a concerted effort by 
Europe acting in an integrated, collective manner to coordinate the aid package. Marshall’s 
speech and subsequent suggestions in conversations with European leaders sparked immediate 
effort to set up the necessary framework for the proposed aid. Within six weeks, the European 
heads of government had gathered in Paris to establish the Conference for European Economic 
Cooperation. At that meeting, the European states organized a co-operation committee composed 
of each member state of the Conference and any other European state that wished to take part in 
the coordination of the economic aid coming from the United States.6 A full report detailing the 
specifics of the coordination committee was drafted and signed in Paris on September 22, 1947.7 
Thus, the earliest form of European integration had emerged.  
With the organizational structure in place in Europe, the Truman Administration 
                                                 
4 George Marshall, speech, Cambridge, MA, June 5, 1947, http://www.oecd.org/general 
/themarshallplanspeechatharvarduniversity5june1947.htm (accessed November 4, 2013). 
5 Ibid. 
6 Draft Plan for the Establishment of a Cooperation Committee, July 13, 1947, Historical 
Archives of the European Union-Florence, 
http://www.cvce.eu/obj/draft_plan_for_the_establishment_of_a_cooperation_committee_ 
paris_13_ july_1947-en-62e5536c-db04-4842-87c7-483f7b0e3987.html (accessed November 4, 
2013). 




successfully pushed through Congress the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948. The bill—whose 
stated purpose was to “promote world peace and the general welfare, national interest, and 
foreign policy of the United States through economic, financial, and other means necessary to the 
maintenance of conditions abroad in which free institutions may survive and consistent with the 
maintenance of the strength and stability of the United States”—authorized the disbursement of 
over $6 billion of aid to the sixteen Western European states plus West Germany, China, Greece, 
and Turkey.8 The bill did more than provide aid to Europe, however; it established a precedent 
for American policy toward European integration. Title I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 
stated, “it is declared to be the policy of the people of the United States to encourage these 
countries through a joint organization to exert sustained common efforts . . . which will speedily 
achieve the economic cooperation in Europe which is essential for lasting peace and prosperity.”9 
While Senators J. William Fulbright and Elbert D. Thomas had proposed a resolution calling for 
public support of a United States of Europe as early as March 1947, this simple declaration of 
policy in the Foreign Assistance Act was the first formal adoption of an American position 
concerning the question of European integration, since the Fulbright resolution was never 
brought to a vote.10 Yet, one must ask what the United States had to gain from an integrated 
Europe. Why was it so important that the United States push for European unity?   
The United States had several reasons for promoting a stronger Europe. As historian Geir 
Lundestad observes in his book “Empire by Integration,” the United States had five key motives 
for supporting an integrated Europe. First, the United States has long believed that “the 
American model” is a universally applicable pattern of state development that all other nations 
                                                 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Geir Lundestad, “Empire” by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 
1945–1997 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 14. 
 
9 
should follow.11 Second, American leaders felt that an integrated Europe was a “more rational 
and efficient Europe.”12 This would make the continent more viable economically, and, by 
replacing old-world nationalism with a new unity-driven mentality, it would also make it more 
stable, less prone to war, and less difficult to work with. Third, a unified Europe meant a lesser 
American burden. Economically the United States would benefit from the European states 
cooperating with each other in the implementation of the Marshall Plan because it decreased the 
likelihood of Europe needing additional aid after the Marshall Plan had ended. From a defense 
perspective, Americans hoped that a stronger Europe would allow the United States to decrease 
its number of troops in Europe, relying instead on a European defense initiative. The final two 
motives for American support of European Integration informed the notion of double 
containment, i.e. the containment of both the Soviet Union and Germany. Lundestad notes that 
these two reasons are significantly more important motivations for American policy than the 
previous three. Operating under the tenets of George Kennan’s famous strategy of 
containment—albeit a much more global iteration of containment than Kennan ever intended—
the United States was determined to contain the spread of communism and the Soviet Union. Yet, 
for American and Western European leaders, Germany was also in need of containment. The US 
viewed Germany as the key to economic revitalization in Europe, and top officials knew that the 
only path to that goal was to ensure that Germany remained solidly pro-Western. In sum, to 
Washington European integration seemed a necessary and important step in achieving its Cold 
War aims. This favorable approach to European unity would continue to prevail throughout the 
administrations of Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson.13 
                                                 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid, 16. 
13 Ibid, 13–28. 
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 While American officials were largely optimistic about the earliest forms of European 
integration, the British had a very different mindset. Having firmly supported the Marshall Plan’s 
Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), the British soon began to see 
unwelcome advances in the name of European unity. In May 1950, the French Foreign Minister 
Robert Schuman, together with his colleague Jean Monnet, announced a plan for a supranational 
pool of industrial resources formed by the individual European states linking their coal and steel 
production and reserves. The supranational component of the plan was further intensified by 
Monnet’s plan for a high authority that would regulate the actions of the industrial sectors of 
each participating state. This new organization, known as the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC), was the first major effort toward integration initiated by the Europeans 
themselves without American involvement.14 
 The British viewed this plan quite differently from their counterparts in France, Germany, 
and even the United States. They welcomed the broader idea of coordinating the steel and coal 
industries of the various European states, especially since it would allow the rest of Europe to 
control the much needed industrial resources of Germany. Yet, as John Young observes, “feeling 
in London was now firmly opposed to any third force which might threaten the cohesion of the 
Atlantic alliance.”15 This prevailing sentiment should have come as no surprise, however. The 
previous year, British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin had circulated a white paper entitled “A 
Third World Power or Western Consolidation,” which expressly rejected the idea that Britain 
should focus its efforts on creating a Europe as a third force in the world equal to the United 
States and the Soviet Union. The white paper also noted that cooperation with the United States 
                                                 
14 John W. Young, Britain and European Unity, 1945-1999, 2nd ed. (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 2000), 26–27. 
15 Ibid, 29. 
 
11 
was essential to the interests of Great Britain and the Commonwealth.16 Thus, it was in this 
context that Bevin and the Foreign Office recommended to His Majesty’s government that the 
British not accept the Schuman Plan. The French were asking the British for a supranational 
commitment with indefinite potential, and that was too great of a sacrifice for a government still 
clinging to its empire.17 Bevin further believed that nationalism would eventually undermine 
European unity, a belief that inevitably carried over in his approach to the Schuman Plan.18 Yet, 
as Edmund Dell observes, government bureaucrats within the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office rather than the cabinet-level ministers themselves crafted much of the opposition to 
British acceptance of the Schuman Plan with little regard for the true national interests of Britain. 
When Bevin accepted this policy formulation of his subordinates and the government publicly 
expressed opposition to the Schuman Plan, Britain abdicated its position of leadership in Europe, 
encouraging a Franco-German leadership within Europe that still has enormous control.19 Having 
thus chosen to relinquish leadership of Europe, Bevin predicted the plan would eventually fail, 
leaving him with an opportunity to present a new alternative, independent of supranationalism. 
Bevin was mistaken in his calculations, though, and by the end of 1951 a new group of 
Conservative Members of Parliament (MPs) headed by Harold Macmillan were gaining 
popularity as a more pro-European alternative to Bevin’s Labour government.20 
 The British turn toward Europe that began developing under conservative leaders in the 
                                                 
16 The National Archives, “The FCO: Policy, People, and Places—Some Officials, 




17 Young, 29. 
18 The National Archives, “The FCO: Policy, People, and Places.” 
19 Edmund Dell, The Schuman Plan and British Abdication of Leadership in Europe 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 289–300. 
20 Young, 30–32. 
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aftermath of the Schuman Plan debate would have significant ramifications as the rest of the 
continent discussed further integration through a new European Economic Community (EEC). 
The EEC was born out of the final report of the Spaak Committee—a committee headed by 
former Belgian Prime Minister Paul Henri Spaak that was charged with the task of conducting a 
preliminary study on the creation of a European economic union. The committee’s findings were 
presented to the six members of the ECSC—France; West Germany; the three Benelux states of 
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg; and Italy—at a conference in Venice in May 1956, 
at which time they voted to draw up a treaty formally creating Euratom and the EEC. The Rome 
Treaty was formally signed on March 25, 1957.21 While “the Six” were busily dealing with the 
creation of the EEC, the British were focused on other initiatives. Favoring a free trade 
agreement over a supranational economic union and common market, the British government—
headed by Anthony Eden with Harold Macmillan serving as Chancellor of the Exchequer—was 
diligently working to complete its FTA proposal before the establishment of the EEC. In July 
1956, Macmillan submitted his Plan G, calling for a FTA within the OEEC that would be open to 
all OEEC members and allow “the Six” to enter the FTA as a collective unit. The British plan 
also exempted foodstuffs from the FTA and failed to extend the agreement to the European 
colonial spheres.22 When Macmillan became Prime Minister in 1957, he continued his push for a 
FTA, even after the EEC went into effect. Yet despite his best efforts, the FTA failed to 
materialize. In March 1958, after the European Common Market entered into effect, the French 
government called on the EEC to implement a FTA within the EEC with greater urgency than 
the proposed British FTA. Such strong French opposition to the British plan inevitably hindered 
the British efforts; hopes for the British plan further deteriorated as Charles de Gaulle returned to 
                                                 
21 Ibid, 40–48. 
22 Ibid, 47–48. 
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power in France as the first president of the Fifth Republic in January 1958. By October, de 
Gaulle had persuaded the other six members of the EEC that any decision on the FTA should be 
unanimous, knowing that France would never accept the FTA. Having essentially exacted a veto 
power, de Gaulle had issued the death sentence to the British FTA, which was formally reported 
as a failure in December 1959.23 With his plan for a non-EEC alternative rejected, Macmillan 
was forced to find a different way to move toward Europe. 
 In 1961, Macmillan took his pro-Europe outlook to a new level as Britain began its first 
serious consideration of joining the EEC. 1961 brought a peculiar change to the British 
economy; for the first time in history, Great Britain exported more to Europe than it did to the 
Commonwealth. This shifting trade balance and a several new political realities concerning the 
strength of the Six yielded a dynamic change in British foreign affairs, prompting Macmillan and 
his cabinet to vote in favor of applying for admission to the EC on July 24, 1961—a move 
Edward Heath called, “the end of a glorious era, that of the British empire, and the beginning of 
a whole new chapter of British history.”24 After a heated August debate in Parliament that 
yielded support for the application, the Six agreed to formally begin talks on September 26.25 
The head of the British delegation in the talks was a young, Conservative minister and the sitting 
Lord Privy Seal, Edward Heath. When negotiations began in November, Heath made no qualms 
about Britain’s commitment to Europe. As he announced in his opening statement: “In saying 
that we wish to join the EEC, we mean that we desire to become full, whole-hearted, and active 
members of the European Community in its widest sense and to go forward with you in the 
                                                 
23 Ibid, 53–60. 
24 Edward Heath, The Course of My Life: My Autobiography (London: Hodder & 
Stoughton, 1998), 203. 
25 Young, 70–71.  
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building of a new Europe.”26 The Six viewed Heath’s statement as a welcome overture, since 
most of the heads of state had suspected that Britain would hold to its past position of limited 
support. As negotiations continued over the following months, the main issues to be resolved 
between Great Britain and the EEC were concerning tariffs and the newly adopted Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP), which was finalized by the EEC members in January 1962. The two 
sides set an initial deadline for the full adoption of the British policy changes needed for entry to 
be completed by August. The British worked to ensure the deadline was met, but setbacks 
continued as several Commonwealth states objected to changes to the tariff policy and the British 
government objected to CAP for its insistence upon converting the entire system of British 
agricultural support.27  
The initial deadline for negotiations came and passed, however, as new issues emerged—
most notably the nuclear question. When Prime Minister MacMillan and President Kennedy 
reached an agreement concerning the addition of American Polaris missiles and submarines to 
the British fleet (contingent upon NATO access to these weapons), French President Charles de 
Gaulle—the most influential leader of the EEC—heavily criticized the British action and 
rebuffed a similar offer from the United States. For de Gaulle, this episode was proof that the 
British were not serious about severing their close ties with the United States in order to move 
closer to Europe. On an issue of such significance as nuclear weapons, de Gaulle saw no room 
for compromise.28 With de Gaulle now firmly against British entry into the EEC, the negotiation 
process seemed bound to fail. The final negotiations were set for a three-week session beginning 
on January 14, 1963, but after only three days, the French voted to suspend negotiations. At that 
                                                 
26 Heath, 214. 
27 Ibid, 216–20. 
28 Ibid, 226–28. 
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time, a meeting was set for January 28 to determine whether or not negotiations would be 
permanently ended. Despite strong support from Paul Henri-Spaak and the other four non-French 
leaders, the conclusion reached at the EEC Commission meeting was that negotiations were to be 
ended; General de Gaulle had vetoed British entry despite strong support from the other five 
member states.29 Macmillan’s plan to move toward Europe through EEC membership would 
have to wait.  
Around the same time that Britain began considering entry into the EEC, the mantle of 
American leadership was passed to a new generation. The young, vibrant President Kennedy and 
the Ivy League intellectuals that comprised his cabinet—many of whom were outspoken 
proponents of European integration—saw this as a great opportunity for America.30 Continuing 
the aforementioned American policy of supporting European Integration, Kennedy welcomed 
British entry into the EEC. For the Kennedy administration, this represented a new opportunity 
to strengthen the EEC. In a policy directive in April 1961, Kennedy stated that “The Six should 
be encouraged to welcome U.K. association with the community and not set the price too high 
for such association, providing that there is to be no weakening of essential ties among the 
Six.”31 The Kennedy administration also saw it as a strategic move that would enhance American 
influence and reorient the EEC’s focus more toward transatlantic cooperation.32 Yet, such strong 
American support for British entry was a significant factor in the French veto of Britain’s 
application. General de Gaulle’s press conference on January 14 showed explicitly that he was 
opposed to Britain having “special political and military relations” with the United States while 
                                                 
29 Ibid, 228–37. 
30 Pascaline Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the United States of Europe (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 139–160. 
31 John Kennedy, “Policy Directive: NATO and the Atlantic Nations,” April 20, 1961, 




they were trying to join the rest of Europe out of fear of a “colossal Atlantic Community” being 
formed that would be “dependent upon America and directed by America.”33 The great 
opportunity envisioned by Kennedy was de Gaulle’s great fear, and the two visions were not 
compatible.34  
The failure of the Macmillan government to join the EEC was compounded by domestic 
policy failures that ultimately led to a change of government in 1964. The new Labour-led 
government, headed by Prime Minister Harold Wilson, took office in October 1964, and 
represented what many believed to be the death knell for the progress made toward European 
integration by Macmillan, Heath, and others. Despite his initial reluctance and past criticism of 
British entry into the EEC, Wilson soon found himself in an environment where another 
membership bid was the best political option. Two of Wilson’s most influential ministers by 
1965 were Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart and Minister of the Department of Economic 
Affairs George Brown. Both Brown and Stewart were supporters of European integration. They 
both felt that Britain’s best chance to remain a relevant world power was in the new international 
community developing in Europe. Brown and Stewart used their influence in policy making to 
advance a “pro-market” agenda that favored British entry into the EEC for the good of the 
British economy.35 For Wilson, however, there were other factors at play in his eventual decision 
to reapply for membership. As John Young points out, Wilson, unlike his predecessor, saw de 
Gaulle as a man that he could work with. As the EEC gradually attempted to gain more 
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sovereignty over the individual members, de Gaulle had proven that he would be a champion of 
state sovereignty and was responsible for the passage of the Luxembourg Compromise that 
allowed individual states to have veto power on major issues. For Wilson, de Gaulle’s 
international views offered a common bond that would allow the two nations to work together to 
prevent the rest of Europe from moving toward an overly supranational association. Furthermore, 
Wilson saw an opportunity to help shape the policy for the future of Europe, specifically in 
regard to CAP.36 The final push to convince Wilson, however, was the Sterling crisis of July 
1966. When a domestic strike—the final blow in a series of economic woes—caused a run on 
Sterling, the British economy found itself in a crisis that resulted in deflationary measures being 
taken to avoid devaluing the currency. The crisis affected both sides of the argument concerning 
European integration—to the EEC member states the crisis showed the weakness of the British 
economy and raised questions (particularly in the mind of the French) about Britain’s ability to 
join the common market; on the other hand, it showed that Great Britain vitally needed to join 
the EEC to stabilize its economic problems.37 All parties in Britain now agreed something must 
be done.  
 In November 1966, the cabinet officially launched a probe into a second British 
application for membership in the EEC. Knowing that their probe into membership was just as 
contingent upon France as it was previously, Wilson and Brown made a visit to Paris in January 
1967. Despite their best efforts to convince him otherwise, de Gaulle reiterated his concerns that 
Britain was too close to the United States and expressed dogmatic adherence to the pro-French 
policies of CAP. De Gaulle, instead, suggested Britain join as an associate member, a slap in the 
face to Wilson and the British. When Wilson expressed his desire for full membership or no 
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association at all, de Gaulle agreed to consider it, a significant move from his previous outright 
refusal. With more confidence than he had when he arrived in France, Wilson left Paris and 
continued his probe by visiting each of the other five capitals by early March.38 Having received 
what he believed to be a favorable response, Wilson was even more determined to move forward 
with Britain’s application. For Wilson, the time was right to apply, and whether the British 
people accepted it or not, entry into the EEC was a matter of great necessity if Great Britain 
intended to keep its place as a major world player.39 Feeling strongly about the importance of the 
application, Wilson acted with urgency and held a special ministerial meeting at the end of April 
1967. The meeting yielded a consensus in favor of membership, which was finalized in a cabinet 
meeting on May 2.40 The Labour government was determined to keep Britain relevant by joining 
the rest of Europe. 
In July 1967, Britain formally submitted its application to the Six for full consideration. 
This move was again welcomed by the United States as a step in the right direction for the future 
of Great Britain, NATO, and Europe. Johnson—who Thomas Schwartz argues was keenly 
attuned to American relations with Europe—was fully aware of de Gaulle’s objections to 
American interference in Europe, and informed Wilson that the US would be very low-key on 
the issue. While remaining relatively quiet, Johnson reiterated to Wilson that the United States 
viewed the decision most positively and was willing to help “smooth the path” if it could help in 
any way.41 Having realized that his chances of persuading de Gaulle were nearly non-existent, 
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Wilson began working to build support from the remaining five in hopes that they would 
pressure France into approving the application. Yet, even with help from the other five nations, 
the British application hinged on de Gaulle’s verdict. On November 22, General de Gaulle held a 
press conference in which he expressed his opposition to the British membership following a 
devaluation of the Pound. Five days later, he announced that Britain would have to make “very 
vast and deep changes” before it could be considered for membership in the EEC.42 Ultimately, 
the EEC ministers reached a collective agreement on December 19 that all discussions 
concerning British membership should end.43 Thus, de Gaulle and the French had twice rebuffed 
the British, leaving the Labour Government’s prospects for future success diminished.  
Yet the tide would soon change in the international scene. As the cultural revolution of 
1968 swept across the globe, political changes took place in their wake. Beleaguered and 
concerned about his possibility for reelection following the aftermath of the Tet Offensive in 
Vietnam, on March 31, 1968, President Johnson announced that he would not seek re-election in 
the fall election.44 With President Johnson no longer in the race and the political climate 
changing, the conservative realist Richard Nixon was poised for a return to executive leadership 
accompanied by his foreign policy expert Henry Kissinger. The political shakeup of 1968 also 
hit France, after General de Gaulle and his government had been completely caught off guard by 
the student protests of May. General de Gaulle finally resigned the French presidency in April 
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1969, elevating Georges Pompidou to France’s highest office.45 Matters in Britain also continued 
to change, as domestic matters allowed the Conservatives to take power from the Labour Party in 
a general election of 1970. Leading the new government was the long-time champion of British 
entry into the EEC, Edward Heath, who replaced Harold Wilson as premier.46 The future of the 
special relationship and British membership in the EEC was now in the hands of a different set 
of leaders. Truly the stage had been set for a period of change.  
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Foreign Policy for the 1970s 
 
In his first foreign policy report to Congress, delivered February 18, 1970, President 
Richard Nixon announced: 
When I took office, the most immediate problem facing our nation was the war in 
Vietnam. . . . Yet the fundamental task confronting us was more profound. We could see 
that the whole pattern of international politics was changing. Our challenge was to 
understand that change, to define America's goals for the next period, and to set in motion 
policies to achieve them. . . . This first annual report on U.S. foreign policy is more than a 
record of one year. It is this Administration's statement of a new approach to foreign 
policy to match a new era of international relations.47 
 
Mr. Nixon was certainly correct; a “new era of international relations” required a new approach 
to foreign policy. Nixon was an astute foreign policy practitioner. His experience in Congress 
and the Vice Presidency had placed him in a unique position to manage this changing era of 
international politics. Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger were poised to change the foreign 
policy of the United States in profound ways. Meanwhile, a similar change was occurring across 
the pond. When Sir Alec Douglas-Home returned to once again lead the Foreign Office as 
Edward Heath’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, he noted that, “the international scenario seemed to 
be  ‘the mixture as before,’ but there were in fact some subtle changes.”48 These “subtle 
changes,” Douglas-Home went on to explain, were all related to the international environment: 
Soviet nuclear parity with the United States, the Sino-Soviet Split, and growing support for 
British entry into the EEC. These changes, however subtle the British minister may have felt 
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them to be, required Heath and his Conservative government, like that of President Nixon, to 
formulate a new foreign policy that would lead Britain forward.  
Quickly setting a new, specific foreign policy designed to achieve set goals was a 
primary concern for Nixon and his foreign policy staff, led primarily by National Security 
Advisor Henry Kissinger. Crafting such a policy, however, was no easy task. As Henry Kissinger 
noted, “Simultaneously we had to end a war, manage a global rivalry with the Soviet Union in 
the shadow of nuclear weapons, reinvigorate our alliance with the industrial democracies, and 
integrate the new nations into a new world equilibrium that would last only if it was compatible 
with the aspiration of all nations.”49 Realizing the gravity of their task, Nixon and Kissinger set 
to work from the moment Dr. Kissinger accepted the appointment as National Security Advisor 
(NSA) on November 30, 1968.50 For the Nixon Administration, the key to this new era of 
international relations was to build “a durable framework of peace.”51 To achieve this end, Nixon 
set forth seven key foreign policy goals: 1) improved relations with the Soviet Union; 2) the 
global inclusion of China; 3) strengthening relations with Europe; 4) Ending the Vietnam War; 
5) developing a stronger, more powerful military and defense policy; 6) increased international 
cooperation; and 7) increased international participation in the peace process.52 These foreign 
policy goals would set the agenda for everything President Nixon hoped to achieve on the world 
stage. Yet the global stage on which he was acting now included more players than it had 
previously.  
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As has been discussed, a new international environment had emerged by the time Nixon 
took office. Most notably in this changing global arena was the emergence of questions 
concerning the sustainability and desirability of the bipolar system. Nuclear parity with the 
Soviet Union made bipolar tension less desirable, while the increasing power of China and the 
Sino-Soviet split indicated that the United States and the rest of the Western alliance could no 
longer ignore China. The increasing pressure for European integration raised new questions 
about the role Western Europe would play on the world stage. All of these geopolitical changes 
led Nixon and Kissinger to increasingly view the world from a multipolar perspective, 
acknowledging “five great power centers (the US, Western Europe, Japan, Russia, and China).”53 
While acknowledging the dilution of the cold war bipolar structure into these five major centers, 
and even the relative decline of the United States, the administration saw both Western Europe 
and Japan as allies, not independent powers of the same magnitude. Thus, the Cold War became 
a tripolar competition where the United States, the Soviet Union, and China were the main 
players. The realities of international relations were such that the old order of bipolarism could 
no longer be sustained, according to Washington; changing the way America viewed the world 
and international politics was the only way Nixon and Kissinger could successfully navigate 
foreign policy in the 1970s. Thus, the United States’ major foreign policy goals were situated in 
a new light.  
The obvious beginning point for achieving new foreign policy goals in a tripolar world 
was to make it truly tripolar by opening to China. Chinese power was growing in influence and 
military strength to the extent that it assumed a place as a third global player. Nixon had long 
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acknowledged the need to harness China’s increasing power and bring it into the realm of 
managed international politics. In an article written for Foreign Affairs in October 1967, he 
stated, “Taking the long view, we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family 
of nations. . . . For the long run, it means pulling China back into the world community—but as a 
great and progressing nation, not as the epicenter of world revolution.”54 Nixon’s desire for 
China’s inclusion in the global community soon began influencing policy decisions. The new 
policy was a logical outgrowth of changing perceptions of global power. China as a global power 
would serve as a check upon Soviet power, while improved relations were key to ending the 
conflict in Southeast Asia.55 As early as February 5, 1969 the administration had begun an 
interdepartmental study into current relations with China and strategies for improving Sino-
American Relations. To achieve this goal, however, the administration opted to largely follow a 
path of secretive, personal diplomacy outside the public eye. The dialogue that would take place 
between the United States and China from 1969–73 would occur largely at the highest levels and 
with great attention to controlling the flow of information. Ultimately, it would be President 
Nixon and Dr. Kissinger that opened the door to China. In the search for a new foreign policy, 
the opening to China made it clear that America now saw the world differently. The bipolar 
struggle had been replaced by a new tripolar view. 
Coupled with the opening to China and balancing of global power was bringing the 
contest between the US and USSR under control. That meant relaxing tensions between the two 
states—known more commonly as détente. By 1970, the Soviet Union was quickly approaching 
nuclear parity with the United States. The gap between the two superpowers was ever shrinking, 
and the Soviets largely appeared to be winning the battle “for the soul of mankind” in the Third 
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World.56 When viewing Soviet-American relations in the context of a tripolar world, it was clear 
that this increasing Soviet power was a threat to American interests and security. The best means 
of preserving American power was thus to relax tension and slow down the power change 
dynamic by stabilizing the global competition. “Peace could not depend solely on the uneasy 
equilibrium between two nuclear giants.”57 Rather, the United States “had a responsibility to 
work for positive relations with the Soviet Union.”58 To achieve this goal, the administration 
sought to conduct serious negotiations with the Soviet Union on specific issues with the hope of 
bringing about consensus. Possible negotiations included nonproliferation and arms reduction 
treaties between the US and USSR. Furthermore, these negotiations were designed to “create 
vested interests on both sides in restraint and the strengthening of peace.”59 Such an aim, 
however, would require sacrifices on both sides, policies that no longer encouraged tactical 
maneuvering to undercut the other, and a certain amount of trust that the other party would abide 
by its treaty commitments.60 To Kissinger the arch-realist, though, sacrifices such as limiting 
certain types of nuclear weapons were a small price to pay to maintain the existing international 
system and ensure peace for the rest of the world. Thus, détente would become the name of the 
game for much of the 1970s. 
Yet détente was not necessarily a popular policy with America’s European allies, 
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including Great Britain. In a December 1970 NATO communiqué, the Atlantic alliance made it 
clear that “NATO’s approach to security in the 1970s will be based on the twin concepts of 
defence and détente.”61 This combination of defense and détente—two concepts seemingly at 
odds with each other—had been a hallmark of NATO policy since the Harmel Report of 1967, 
which, at the request of the smaller NATO member states, placed détente (a policy contingent 
upon greater inter-alliance consultation) on an equal footing with defense as the goals of 
NATO.62 Yet détente could not result in a reduction of tensions solely between the two 
superpowers. For Europe, a distinctly American relaxation of tension with the Soviet Union 
signaled a retreat from Europe. As early as January 1969, American foreign policy reports were 
indicating that, “despite the extensive consultations on the nonproliferation treaty, many 
Europeans remain suspicious that the treaty is an attempt to formalize the hegemonic position of 
the US and the USSR.”63 The report went on to say, “A few of the member governments, notably 
West Germany, view the projected US-Soviet talks on strategic arms limitation as a potential 
threat to the US nuclear guarantee.”64 Growing skepticism of American moves toward détente 
was typical of many European heads of state, who cited détente as an example of America’s self-
centered foreign policy. Even those who accepted that the United States would inevitably deal 
directly with the Soviet Union became “determined to keep a close check on US initiatives 
                                                 
61 “Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the 
Department of State,” December 3, 1970, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, 
Volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972 (Washington, DC: Government Printing 
Office, 2012), 236. (Hereafter abbreviated as FRUS, 1969–1976: Western Europe; NATO) 
62 Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance 
(Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2004), 42–44. 
63 “Intelligence Memorandum Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency,” January 21, 




through expanded interallied consultation” because of their fears of American policy.65 These 
fears of American self-centeredness would not soon abate. By the end of 1972, many Europeans 
continued to question “whether Washington’s interest in détente extend[ed] much beyond a 
desire to reduce the cost to the US of the present system of East-West relations in Europe.”66 
Despite desiring détente themselves, the Europeans continued to remain wary of the American-
led initiative.  
The British, America’s closest ally, were no exception. In the first weeks after taking 
office, President Nixon embarked on a European tour in an effort to strengthen and renew the 
NATO alliance and build relationships with his European counterparts. While in London from 
February 24-26, Nixon, Kissinger, Secretary of State William Rogers, and others met with then 
Prime Minister Harold Wilson and his cabinet. Wilson’s Labour government, just weeks into the 
new Nixon presidency, was already expressing concern over détente. Michael Stewart, the 
British Foreign Secretary, made it clear during that meeting that détente with the Soviets was 
essential, but an American only détente would undermine the entire Western alliance. The 
British expected consultation before any American actions were taken as a safeguard for their 
own security.67 In the words of Henry Kissinger describing the British position, “he [Stewart] 
thereby revealed the ambivalence of our European allies. In times of rising tension, they feared 
American rigidity; in times of relaxing tension; they dreaded a US-Soviet condominium.”68 The 
British clearly resisted America’s excessive reliance on détente from the beginning. Yet, the 
British position would change very little once Heath’s Conservative government took over in 
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1970. Heath and his government, like most of the NATO members, came to believe that “the 
Americans are now viewing the international scene increasingly in terms of their superpower 
relationship with the USSR, and that they may be prepared to subordinate the interests of their 
European allies.”69 This growing concern of Heath that the United States was turning ever more 
inward would become a factor propelling the decision of his government to move closer to 
Europe. Thus, what emerges from the study of détente is far from a universally accepted policy 
seen as a means of achieving peace. While all parties acknowledged a need for relaxed tension 
with the Soviet Union, the British and most other European powers feared that the Nixon-
Kissinger approach would leave them hanging out to dry.  
The relationship between the United States and Europe occupied a unique place within 
the broader context of American foreign policy changes. The strengthening of relations with 
Europe was one of the major foreign policy goals of the Nixon administration. Nixon realized 
that transatlantic relations had begun to suffer during the mid-late 1960s. The unpopularity of 
Vietnam, the Gaullist challenge to America, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and cool personal 
relations between President Johnson and many European leaders had certainly contributed to a 
growing spirit of anti-Americanism in Europe and less than preferable political relations. While 
it is important to note, like Thomas Schwartz and Piers Ludlow do, that these strains did not 
cause a major crisis in transatlantic relations in the 1960s, it is certain that the situation Nixon 
found himself in had the potential for dangerous results.70 Furthermore, the deterioration of 
transatlantic relations had been a point of contention between Nixon and Humphrey during the 
1968 campaign; Nixon in particular lambasted the Democratic candidate for the way Johnson 
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and Humphrey had handled relations among the NATO alliance. Yet for all of the 
administration’s emphasis on a changing geopolitical worldview and the need to restore relations 
with Europe, the possibility of an independent Europe as a fourth center of power was never 
viable. In a report prepared for the NSC in January 1970, Kissinger outlined three alternative 
structures for US-USSR-European relations. The first option called for maintaining the status 
quo—American dominance of Western Europe, Soviet dominance of Eastern Europe, and a 
loosely organized Western Europe that was largely dependent upon the US.71 The second option 
was an enhanced Western Europe, in which a more highly organized Europe was “a significant, 
independent power complex still linked to the US in a defense treaty and relying, ultimately, on a 
US nuclear guarantee.”72 The third option called for complete Soviet and American 
disengagement from Europe.73 Upon further analysis, Kissinger concluded that option three—
which would have come the closest to allowing a free, independent Europe to be a fourth center 
of power in a multipolar setting—was not practical. Instead, he recommended that the United 
States consider the first two options, both of which prevented Europe from becoming an 
independent center of power. The administration had made it clear that Europe was to be an 
affiliate of the United States—an extension of its power—and not an independent, unified actor. 
Thus, the new direction of America’s European policy called for continued prominence of the 
transatlantic relationship, increased partnership, shared responsibility for defense matters, 
revitalization of NATO, consultation on security and defense measures, and expanded 
                                                 
71 “Paper prepared in the Department of State and in the National Security Council,” 





cooperation to address the social and human challenges facing the world.74 This new foreign 
policy approach to Europe will be the subject of the next chapter.  
With its foreign policy goals outlined, there remained just one key component necessary 
for the Nixon administration—how to achieve these goals. The institutional structure of foreign 
policy had been somewhat in flux since the onset of the Cold War. While the State Department 
maintained the most control on foreign policy and its implementation, the creation of the 
National Security Council (NSC) changed how foreign policy was formulated and handled. Yet, 
even within the structure of the NSC, there had been differences. The Eisenhower NSC was 
largely run and controlled by the White House. Under Kennedy, the NSC added ExComm (the 
Executive Committee of the NSC) as a specialized group of close, important advisors to the 
President largely controlled by Attorney General Bobby Kennedy. Nixon criticized the Johnson 
administration’s NSC for its ineffective and bureaucratic pandering that catered to the president’s 
amour propre.75 Having realized the limitations of the existing system, Nixon’s first task for his 
newly appointed NSA was to restructure the national security mechanism.  
As a member of the NSC while Vice President, Nixon had come to prefer the tightly 
controlled, diverse structure of Eisenhower’s NSC. This should come as little surprise, though. 
As Henry Kissinger observed, an effective decision-making machinery “must be compatible with 
his [the President’s] personality and style, . . . must lead to action, . . . [and] above all, it must be 
sensitive to the psychological relationship between the President and his close advisors.”76 Given 
the nature of Richard Nixon’s personality and his relationship with Henry Kissinger, it is of little 
wonder that he would prefer the NSC to be tightly controlled within the White House. 
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Furthermore, both Nixon and Kissinger held the firm belief that “a President should never leave 
the presentation of his option to one of the Cabinet departments or agencies.” With this in mind, 
the new structure presented to Nixon in January 1969 called for strong White House control and 
downplayed the role of the individual departments.77 Having been tentatively approved by the 
president, the new NSC structure almost immediately proved unpopular with both Secretary of 
Defense Melvyn Laird and Secretary of State William Rogers. Rogers, who resented the State 
Department’s exclusion from much of the foreign policy decision-making process, spent the two 
weeks before the inauguration attempting to persuade the president of the importance of the State 
Department as the “executive agent for the President for the design and conduct of foreign 
policy,” but to no avail.78 Nixon refused to back down, and finalized the new structure on 
January 19, 1969.79 Problems would continue for the duration of the first term between the State 
Department and the White House. Records of the conversations between Henry Kissinger and 
Undersecretary of State John Irwin show that the State Department was often excluded from the 
foreign policy process. Some of Irwin’s chief complaints were that the White House did not 
distribute meeting records quickly, held meetings with foreign leaders without State Department 
officials present, and “conducted diplomatic discussions with foreign diplomats directly and 
without the knowledge of the department.”80 Despite the State Department’s continued 
frustration, foreign policy was going to be decided upon and administered by the White House. 
The structure and control of the foreign policy mechanism would have significant implications 
on how policy was developed, whose input mattered most, and which suggestions and objections 
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the president would hear. All of these issues would emerge as the United States reevaluated its 
policy concerning European integration. 
While President Nixon and his White-House-controlled team was busy implementing his 
foreign policy in early 1970, the new British Prime Minister Edward Heath was busy formulating 
another significant foreign policy in the early days of his premiership. With the Conservatives 
winning the June 1970 election, Edward Heath—Leader of the Conservative Party—found 
himself leading Her Majesty’s Government. As with the United States, foreign policy was of 
chief concern for the British in 1970, and the new prime minister acknowledged the importance 
of his task. On October 10, 1970, Edward heath delivered his first speech as Prime Minster to the 
Conservative Party Conference. In that speech, Heath focused primarily on foreign affairs, 
stating, “This Government is now moving into a new era of British diplomacy. . . . We are 
leaving behind the years of retreat. We are determined to establish the reputation of Britain once 
again, a reputation as the firm defender of her own interests and the skilful and persistent partner 
of all those who are working for a lasting peace.”81 His position was now clear—foreign policy 
would be returned to its rightful place as Britain sought to redefine its relationship to the rest of 
the world. Yet Heath’s global interests and ambitions of restored international prestige would 
soon clash with the centralizing, tripolarist tendencies of Richard Nixon. 
First and foremost in Heath’s “new era of British diplomacy” was a continuation of an 
old theme—entry into Europe and the EEC. While this represented a decade-long cadence in 
British foreign affairs, the Heath government had a unique determination to diligently work with 
the rest of Europe to make the policy changes necessary for British entry. For Heath, there was 
no other option. As he observed, “Britain’s influence in Europe was never lower than it was 
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between 1964 and 1970, not least because Britain’s relative economic position was deteriorating 
badly.”82 Yet for Heath, who criticized the Labour government of over emphasizing the 
economic cost of British entry into the EEC, membership was more than a question of 
economics; the issue got to the heart of Britain’s place within the world. He genuinely believed 
“Britain’s future would be dismal outside Europe.”83 As a result, Heath—the first British 
negotiator in the EEC application process—made Britain’s role within Europe a key issue in the 
months leading up to the 1970 election. In a speech in the House of Commons on February 25, 
1970, Heath challenged Prime Minister Harold Wilson to fight the election on “who should 
negotiate for Britain” in its EEC membership, calling for the victorious government to adopt 
policies that would allow Britain to “take its rightful place in the wider Europe which many 
people have worked so long to create.”84 Heath’s insistence on membership within Europe came 
directly from his belief that a strong, unified Europe could represent a new center of independent 
power; Britain would be influential because Europe would be influential. It was clear that Europe 
would assume primacy in Britain’s new foreign policy. Yet such positions were incompatible 
with the Nixon-Kissinger approach that subjected Europe to a minor role in world affairs. The 
extent to which Britain focused on Europe will be examined in greater detail in Chapter Four. 
While Britain’s most urgent foreign policy concern was toward Europe, The Heath 
government also pursued other key goals; one of them was to maintain good relations with the 
United States, while somewhat distancing the British from the Americans. Heath was well aware 
that the other European states had long been skeptical of Britain’s European-ness, in light of its 
close relationship with the United States. When Heath was finally afforded an opportunity to 
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meet with President Nixon in Washington shortly before Christmas 1970, he expressed his desire 
to replace the term “special relationship” with the term “natural relationship.” For Heath, the 
latter term was preferable in that it was not as easily broken as a special relationship and was 
much less likely to offend another ally.85 While publicly Heath was speaking of not offending 
other American allies, one cannot help but think he also feared how the phrase “special 
relationship” was viewed by Britain’s European allies. Yet despite his desire to change the 
rhetoric and remove some of the overt closeness between the two nations, personal relations 
between Nixon and Heath remained warm. Gifts and genuine pleasantries were often exchanged 
when the two leaders met together, while American newspapers commented on the “personal 
friendliness” of the two statesmen.86 From a policy perspective, both leaders undertook 
conscientious efforts to ensure that formal relations remained strong. Thus, Heath’s approach to 
the United States was one of political distance but personal closeness.  
One final foreign policy goal of Edward Heath that garnered significant attention was the 
improving of relations with China. By 1970, the Sino-Soviet split was clear to all, as is observed 
through the previously cited remarks of Alec Douglas-Home upon returning to the Foreign 
Office. This noticeable split propelled Britain in its desire for peaceful relations with China. As 
Douglas-Home observed in October 1971, the British firmly believed, “As China gains in 
confidence Russia will reinsure with the West.”87 This belief coincided with signs from the 
Chinese government that China was “ready for international relations.”88 Beyond all of this, 
Heath saw China as an opportunity for bringing Great Britain out of its economic lag through 
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trade with an ever-expanding market. This prompted Heath to actively pursue an opening to 
China. 89 Douglas-Home would make a visit to China while Foreign Secretary, and Great Britain 
would be the first Western European state to have full diplomatic exchange with the People’s 
Republic, beginning in 1972.90  
Yet such emphasis on China, while seemingly compatible with the American efforts to 
open to China, is another example of how Heath clashed with American policy. As with other 
European initiatives that threatened American policies of international stabilization, a Western 
European opening to China clashed with the tripolar worldview of Nixon and Kissinger. Yet for 
Heath, improved relations with China fit well into his broader foreign and domestic policy goals 
within a truly multipolar world. Unbeknownst to Heath, though, the United States was 
conducting secret diplomatic conversations with China at the same time as the British. As Niklas 
Rossbach observes, the British had even informed Washington of its intentions to open to China, 
which the US then asked the British to delay, all without ever mentioning its own initiatives 
toward Beijing. When the US announced the plan for President Nixon to go to China in 1972, the 
British were caught completely off guard.91 Furthermore, Andrew Scott argues that in choosing 
not to consult the British but instead maintain secrecy, the US turned the issue of opening to 
China from a potential point of convergence to a point of contention, as the American shock had 
completely undercut the British efforts through Nixon and Kissinger’s deceptive approach.92 
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Thus, China, like other issues, shows just how divided the United States and Great Britain were 
in their foreign policy approaches. 
To fully examine the role of the special relationship and the political and economic 
integration of Europe upon American and British foreign relations, one must understand where 
these components fit into the broader foreign policy objectives of each state. What emerges from 
this study of the foreign policy goals of both Richard Nixon and Edward Heath—including those 
goals both directly tied to the broader question of Europe and those in areas outside the 
transatlantic region—is that the 1970s required a new era of foreign policy. The international 
climate was changing and the domestic political situations of the Anglo-American world were 
demanding a new direction. The two heads of government, surrounded by able and brilliant 
foreign policy advisors, established clear goals, crafted new policies, and if necessary, altered the 
very structure of foreign policy making to adapt to the realities of the changing global order. Yet 
setting policy was only half of the battle; the rest of the battle remained to be fought in the 




Reappraising Values: America’s Changing Perceptions Toward European Integration 
 
 President Nixon highly valued the relationship between America and its European allies, 
and vowed to strengthen that bond during his administration. The strength of the transatlantic 
alliance had been a trademark of American foreign policy since the end of World War II and for 
the Nixon-Kissinger team there was a great need for those relations to remain strong. While 
focusing broadly on strengthening American relations with Europe on the whole, particularly by 
reinforcing and reinvigorating NATO, the Nixon Administration was also mindful of its relations 
with individual European states. This combination of both strong individual relationships and a 
collective relationship with Europe can be seen in the United States’ policy toward Great Britain 
and its entry to the EEC. With the chances of British access to the broader, integrated Europe 
finally seeming likely, the United States was forced to reevaluate its long standing policies of 
support for integration and the special relationship. New questions emerged about the economic 
impact further European integration would have upon the United States, and the significance of 
the special relationship came into play as the administration sought to keep its close ties to the 
British while emphasizing NATO over the EEC as the vehicle for European strength. From 
1969–72, the United States underwent a change in policy, as domestic and international realities 
pushed the nation to change its perceptions of European integration and Britain’s role in that 
process.   
When examining any given diplomatic issue, there are often two sides to the topic—what 
the administration says publicly and what it privately decides and practices. The issue of 
America’s position on European integration and British entry into the EEC is no different. In the 
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public eye, the Nixon Administration was keenly aware of the importance of maintaining its 
longstanding full support for the efforts of European integration, particularly as it pertains to 
maintaining transatlantic cohesion. For that reason, the president made it clear in his public 
statements from the outset of his administration that the United States was committed to 
supporting European integration. In a news conference following his visit to Europe in March 
1969, President Nixon stated, “We have also indicated our support of the concept and ideal of 
European unity. . . .  Americans cannot unify Europe. Europeans must do so. And we should not 
become involved in differences among Europeans in which our vital interests are not 
involved.”93 Nixon clearly presented his support for European unity, and stressed the importance 
of it being a European affair. This statement would typify the President’s public statements 
throughout the administration. For the Nixon administration, it was time for the United States to 
pursue a slightly different course from that of its predecessors. It maintained its public support 
for integration, but the nation would not be the outspoken supporter of the effort that it had been 
in the past. Nixon realized that American actions had often hindered the progress, rather than 
helped it.94 Thus, when Prime Minister Wilson visited the United States in January 1970, 
President Nixon informed him, “It is in the interests of the United States to have a strong 
economic, political, and military European community, with the United Kingdom in the 
community.”95 Yet, he went on to note, “For the US to play a heavy-handed role would be 
counter-productive.”96 Again, the president made clear his firm intentions to be supportive, but to 
keep his distance from the actual process of expansion and integration. This emphasis on public 
                                                 
93 Richard M. Nixon, “The President’s News Conference of March 4, 1969,” in Richard 
M. Nixon, Public Papers of the President, Richard Nixon, 1969 (Washington: GPO, 1969), 180. 
94 Richard M. Nixon, United States Foreign Policy for the 1970’s, February 18, 1970 
95 “Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting,” Washington, January 28, 1970, in 




support for the European Community through distance would continue throughout the Nixon 
administration.  
The President’s policy of distancing America from the actual process of integration was 
unique to Nixon. This marked one of the first key points in the administration’s reappraisal of 
traditional American foreign policy. Even before the new administration took office, the 
President and his National Security Advisor had set their policy for Europe. One of the tenets of 
this new foreign policy approach was to “make clear that we will not inject ourselves into intra-
European debates on the form, methods, and timing of steps toward unity.”97 As Lundestad has 
observed, this marked a significant departure from previous policy in that the new administration 
was abandoning the American position of unqualified support for supranationalism within 
Europe. In the public eye, the administration used this policy to show that the United States 
valued its European allies but knew that they must be in charge of their own affairs. In reality, 
this was evidence of the new “ambivalent” attitude of the United States toward the entire process 
of European integration.98 The foreign policy team of the Nixon administration was quickly 
coming to the realization that supranationalism could be more harmful to the United States than 
previous administrations had been willing to concede. Thus, Nixon and his advisors were careful 
to publicly situate the United States as a supporter of a united Europe that independently charted 
its own course toward integration.  
Yet despite the initial public support, there was always some reserved caution in the 
American position. The Nixon administration, like those before him, recognized that the further 
integration of Europe into an independent entity would have a significant impact upon the United 
States. A State Department posture statement prepared in advance of the 1970 NATO ministerial 
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meeting acknowledged these challenges. The statement clearly read, “We recognize that as 
Europe moves toward greater economic unity, various problems will be posed for the United 
States and third countries in the short run.”99 Having acknowledged the likelihood of problems, 
the question was then whether the benefits would outweigh the costs. To answer that question, 
Washington focused on two key aspects—the political implications and the economic 
implications. It would be these two uncertainties that occupied the time and attention of those 
members of the NSC and State Department officials examining American policy in the private 
discussions on American foreign policy. While the Nixon administration publicly announced its 
support for European unity, the deliberations on the implications of this longstanding policy 
would soon begin to change the tenor of the conversation behind closed doors.  
From the earliest days of European unity, the political implications were far less 
worrisome to the United States and generally more positive than the economic implications. This 
mentality largely continued throughout the Nixon administration. The promotion of political 
cooperation among the members of the European Community and Western Europe on the whole 
had been one of the organization’s main goals from its inception. The European Commission and 
the internal structure of the EC were the first steps taken in that direction. Furthermore, these 
institutional arrangements were continually evaluated and reassessed as this young 
intergovernmental organization made steps toward enhanced cooperation. With the expansion of 
the community becoming a real possibility by the summer of 1970, the EC approved a proposal 
put forth by Belgian diplomat Etienne Davignon that called for the creation of a consultative 
mechanism to discuss foreign policy. One of the unique aspects of this new foreign policy 
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coordination effort was its inclusion of the EC applicant states prior to their accession.100 
Another step taken by the EC was the meeting of the Eurogroup on defense burden sharing in the 
fall of 1970.101 These initiatives represented a step forward in the politicization of the EC. As 
Henry Kissinger observed, “Noteworthy is the fact that the new political consultations are linked 
to the Community framework, which does augur for expansion of the Community’s competence 
beyond purely economic affairs.”102  
“Noteworthy” moves toward greater political union were significant for the United 
States, since the expansion of the European Community had direct political implications. Yet 
there were two different aspects of these new realities. The first was the positive ways in which 
closer political union would help the United States. In a report prepared by the State 
Department’s Bureau of European Affairs in 1972, these political implications of European unity 
were brought to the forefront. While noting that the current expansion of the EEC and its 
necessary focus on the economic union had distracted the organization from its efforts at political 
coordination, the Bureau of European Affairs noted, “Conceivably, the process of European 
political cooperation may lead to early development of European views on foreign policy and 
defense issues.”103 The formation of a distinct Western European view on these issues made the 
United States optimistic that Western Europe would serve as a magnet, attracting Eastern Europe 
to the West.104 Commonly known as the “magnet theory,” this belief in subverting the Soviets by 
                                                 
100 Henry Kissinger to Richard Nixon, “Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for 
National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon,” February 18, 1971, in FRUS, 1969-
1976: Western Europe; NATO, 244. 
101 Ibid.  
102 Ibid.  
103 “The Global Political Implications and Consequences Arising from Enlargement of 
the European Community,” Bureau of European Affairs, 1972, File B.5, Records Relating to 




attracting Eastern Europe to Western democracy and life had long been a key approach to US 
foreign relations during the Cold War. In this iteration, the State Department acknowledged that 
it might in the short run increase tension with the Soviet Union and the eastern bloc, but they 
were confident that in the long run, it would ease relations between Eastern and Western Europe, 
thus contributing to détente.105 Key to the success of this magnetic draw, however, was the entry 
of Britain into the EC. The British entry was important in that “a new balance of political forces 
[would] exist within the Community that [would] provide a basis for progress toward political as 
well as economic integration.”106 Furthermore, the British would “introduce to the Community 
their own unique traditions and outlook contributing to the democratic, liberal, and outward 
looking character of the European Community.”107 The State Department firmly believed that the 
political impact of European unity could only be as positive as hoped for if Britain were a part of 
that community. The British were essential to the successful achievement of America’s political 
goals for European unity.  
Yet, for all of the State Department’s hope about the positive impact of European unity 
on the global political scene, the White House keenly realized that there would also be negative 
effects of supranational integration. Henry Kissinger was astutely aware of the ramifications of 
closer integration. Acknowledging the supranational structure of the economic union, he noted, 
“A politically united Europe was more likely to articulate its own conceptions in other areas 
[areas other than economics] as well.”108 This statement by Kissinger aligns closely with the 
remarks by the State Department about the feasibility of a coordinated European foreign policy, 
but draws a much different conclusion. For Nixon and Kissinger, the positive effects of closer 
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political union were not a foregone conclusion.109 Europe could, as in the case of Ostpolitik, 
develop a policy that was at odds with, and even hindering, the policy efforts of the United 
States. For Germany to undertake such a policy was a liability to the entire western alliance.110 
Furthermore, as Kissinger observed, the United States was not even totally convinced that 
Ostpolitik would work the way the Germans intended. The whole principle was dependent upon 
the magnet theory, and the Nixon administration was not sure which magnet was stronger.111 
Such political implications were not welcome moves in the Nixon-Kissinger Foreign Policy plan, 
and can explain in part why President Nixon was so keen on stressing the importance of Europe 
developing their own plan of unity without American interference or encouragement.112 
Despite the consideration of both potential positive and negative results of political 
union, the United States did realize that such efforts would be slow coming. State sovereignty 
continued to remain an important factor for the members of the EEC, particularly France.113 
Similarly, as has already been mentioned, the State Department recognized that the efforts 
toward political cooperation would continue to be secondary, and during these years the attention 
of the organization was noticeably focused solely on the expansion of the economic union. 
Furthermore, Kissinger, after making his remarks about the noteworthy steps taken toward 
cooperation, added, “But this [the function of the organization being as much political as 
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economic] is likely to take some time to develop.”114 Thus, the various American policymaking 
offices realized that political implications were of little immediate significance. While they 
closely followed the progress and seemed optimistic about the results of such political cohesion, 
there remained cautious expectation for significant change in the near future. This understanding 
of the political climate and the speed at which it developed was partially responsible for the 
relatively light focus of the administration on the generally positive political implications. 
In contrast to the political implications of European unity and the generally favorable 
response within the administration to the steps being taken toward closer political union was the 
administration’s consideration of the economic implications of an expanded European 
Community. From the earliest mentions of European unity, it was widely understood that the 
United States would have to give something up in order for Europe to be strengthened. This was 
not lost on the Nixon Administration. In his 1970 foreign policy address, President Nixon stated, 
“We recognize that our interests will necessarily be affected by Europe's evolution, and we may 
have to make sacrifices in the common interest. We consider that the possible economic price of 
a truly unified Europe is outweighed by the gain in the political vitality of the West as a 
whole.”115 Appealing to the political implications of such, the President made clear that the US 
was willing to make some small sacrifices in the name of the greater good. This mentality carried 
over into all statements of American policy toward the EC, as is seen in the government’s 1970 
posture statement. Acknowledging the likelihood of problems, American diplomats were 
instructed to “support the view that the economic and political benefits to us to be derived from 
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European unity will in the long run outweigh such temporary dislocations as may occur.”116 
These statements are important in that they show the United States was not averse to any and all 
sacrifices; instead, the Americans were willing to make concessions if necessary. The extent to 
which the United States would sacrifice, however, soon became another issue.  
As part of the new structure of the National Security Council, individual foreign policy 
issues were studied and decided through a system of memorandums. The NSC would pass a 
National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) authorizing the detailed study of an issue. A 
study would be conducted and information would be compiled by the various agencies through 
an ad hoc committee, and a separate review group would examine the findings of that committee. 
Upon completion of the review, the study would be presented to the entire NSC, outlining the 
whole range of possible options and a recommendation would be made to the President. That 
decision was then recorded in a National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM), which 
would state the conclusion of the NSC and supply the president with the group’s 
recommendations and range of options for what the policy of the United States should be on that 
given issue.117 The issues of European integration and British accession to the EC were no 
exception. NSSM 79 was approved on October 13, 1969. It called for “a study of U.S. policy 
toward U.K. accession to the European Community,” giving special attention to “how these 
forms [of accession] will affect the economic and political unity of the Community, and their 
bearing on the United States.”118 The study called for members of various cabinet level 
departments to meet and develop a report that would analyze all of the potential economic effects 
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on the United States from exports and tariffs to monetary and agricultural policy.119 The scope of 
NSSM 79 was further expanded by NSSM 91, which broadened the focus of the study from 
solely examining the impact of Great Britain joining the EC to now studying EC expansion more 
generally and the policy of preferential trading agreements.120 The administration realized the 
significance of EC expansion and wanted to formulate the best policy to address the situation.  
With authorization from the president, the NSC review process began. Under the 
leadership of Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Martin J. Hillenbrand, the ad hoc 
review committee submitted their findings to Dr. Kissinger in late April 1970. The committee 
found that the transitional period of expansion would produce only small to moderate costs to the 
overall industrial exports of the United States. The bigger issue, according to the committee, 
would be the long-term effects, which would be of the utmost importance but nearly impossible 
to predict with any accuracy.121 The other major economic implications for the United States, 
according to Hillenbrand’s committee, were the ability of the United States to maintain its 
exports to Europe and the negative impact of the EC’s Common Agricultural Policy toward US 
grain exports, which the committee estimated to be somewhere around $100 million.122 To 
counteract these potentially negative impacts, the committee recommended that the United States 
utilize its rights within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) framework. By 
emphasizing the equal rights of each GATT participant, the United States could use existing 
economic agreements to prevent discriminatory trade agreements and export policies within an 
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international, legal context.123 Considering GATT as the main vehicle to ensure America’s 
economic interests were not compromised, the committee recommended three possible options 
for how to handle the expansion of the EEC, with the first two both relying on GATT. The third 
option, however, called for less emphasis on GATT and agriculture, instead focusing on 
consultation between the two organizations and direct appeals to the individual member states.124 
These three options were then forwarded to the Kissinger review group for further action.  
The review group expressed many of the same concerns. While noting that the exact cost 
of economic integration could not be calculated with certainty, the members of the committee—
drawn from officials within the State, Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, Labor, and Defense 
Departments, as well as the CIA and other relevant agencies—agreed that there was a potential 
for negative economic impact on the United States. This proved to be the largest point of 
opposition to British entry in the EC in the early days of policy reevaluation. The Departments of 
Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture, among others, vociferously argued against the harmful 
effects of EC expansion on American imports and exports, both agricultural and otherwise.125 
The extent to which this became public knowledge was soon evident,  as Geoffrey Rippon, 
Britain’s lead EC negotiator, met individually with Secretary of Agriculture Clifford Hardin and 
Secretary of Commerce Maurice Stans in an attempt to dissuade them of the negative economic 
effects for the United States.126 Furthermore, the public emphasis upon the negative impacts for 
American agriculture were such that EC President Franco Malfatti once remarked that the US 
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spoke with two voices—one from the White House and one from the Department of 
Agriculture.127 The economic drawbacks could not be ignored by policymakers. 
Having thus noted the potential for negative economic effects, the committee’s draft 
recommendations for the president observed that an emphasis on GATT rights had achieved little 
progress in previous conversations with the EEC over agricultural and economic policies, and 
accordingly suggested that the president’s directive follow Hillenbrand’s Option 3.128 One of the 
key components of the review group’s suggestion, however, was to “stimulate an initiative from 
the Europeans for some sort of consultative machinery.”129 The group believed that consultation 
between the two organizations was necessary, but that the president should offer some direction 
on how to achieve it. The other important aspect of this consultation was that it needed to be a 
publicly European initiative, despite America encouraging its implementation behind the 
scenes.130 The directive was sent to the president, who in turn set a policy.  
The new policy, formally stated in NSDM 68, was acutely aware of the economic impact 
expansion could have. While noting that the first principle of American policy was to continue to 
support EC expansion, principles two and three both emphasized the economic considerations 
involved. The second principle stated that the US was willing “to accept some—but not 
excessive—economic costs as a result of the accession of new members to the Community,” 
while the third expressed the need for conversations with the individual countries of the EC to 
stress American expectations for European consideration of “the rights and interests of third 
countries, including the U.S. and the importance of maintaining an equitable system of 
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multilateral trading rules.” 131 NSDM 68 further stated that, to help achieve these goals, the US 
should encourage an EC initiative for consultation. If the EC failed to do so, the US should 
suggest an initiative of its own.132 Having set an explicit policy for how to deal with the 
challenges of European integration and further EC expansion, the Nixon administration had 
clearly shown that economic concerns posed a potential problem for American support of this 
major issue.  
Nixon’s reluctance for full support would not soon abate. In his 1971 foreign policy 
report to Congress, President Nixon further clarified where his administration stood on the issue 
of EC expansion and integration. While acknowledging that the US and Europe had fundamental 
common interests, he stopped short of stating that the two bodies had entirely common interests, 
opting to use the word “most” instead.133 He then continued, “For years, however, it was 
believed uncritically that a unified Western Europe would automatically lift burdens from the 
shoulders of the United States. The truth is not so simple. European unity will also pose 
problems for American policy, which it would be idle to ignore.”134 These problems, as Nixon 
outlined them, included many of the issues that had been of concern since the early days of the 
administration—restrictions on agricultural trade and preferential trading agreements. The 
president argued that it was in the best interest of the global economy for the two political 
spheres to resolve these issues as quickly as possible, focusing on “fundamental rather than 
tactical purposes.”135 The president went on to again mention the possibility for further US-EC 
consultation, which had recently begun at a low-level, but as before, the initiative must be from 
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Europe. Thus, the American perception of EC expansion continued to remain largely the same—
supportive but very concerned and skeptical. 
 One answer to the challenges posed to the Americans by European integration was to 
strengthen America’s commitments to Europe in other ways that would allow the United States 
to continue its influence, and advance its “empire by invitation.”136 The obvious vehicle to 
achieve this goal was NATO, and the president wasted no time in advancing his plans to 
strengthen the alliance organization. The emphasis on NATO was based on several key ideas. 
First and foremost, despite the general opinions of the administration about European political 
and economic integration, Nixon believed that “a coherent strategy of European defense, today 
and as far into the future as I [Nixon] can see, will require mutual support across the Atlantic.”137 
Despite his preference for independent moves toward integration, Nixon fundamentally believed 
in transatlantic defense and diplomacy. Similarly, Nixon believed that “NATO was a forum in 
which [the United States] could get action.”138 As opposed to the beliefs of the American 
Permanent Representative to the European Community Robert Schaetzel that the EC 
consultations scheduled to begin in 1970 would be of little overall effect, Nixon trusted that 
NATO would allow him to effect positive change in a direction favorable to the US.139 With 
these ideas in mind, Nixon and his team got to work. At the first NATO ministerial meeting of 
his administration, held April 10, 1969, the president set forth three proposals for future activity: 
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1) regular meetings of the Deputy Foreign Ministers to discuss long-range problems facing the 
alliance; 2) the creation of a political planning group; and 3) the creation of a committee to 
address the “challenges of a modern society.”140 The North Atlantic Council discussed these 
proposals at two meetings in May, responding favorably to the third proposal and negatively to 
the first two.141 The Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society began meeting in 
December.142 This was a step in the right direction according to the administration, but it was far 
from the end. Other issues loomed large within the NATO alliance for both the United States and 
Europe.  
The most pressing issues were strategy and troop presence. Nixon, Kissinger, and the 
Defense Staff, led by Secretary of Defense Melvyn Laird, all believed that the NATO strategy of 
flexible response was inadequate. Initially developed by Robert McNamara during the Kennedy-
Johnson years, flexible response meant having adequate conventional forces to fight for ninety 
days following an attack, with the understanding that other means of conflict resolution would 
end the battle before the ninety days had expired.143 For the new administration, this policy 
posed several problems. The first was financial. Conventional defense with ground troops was 
more expensive than a nuclear-based defense policy. The NSC staff estimated that it would cost 
$12 billion dollars a year to continue its defense positions.144 The costs were further complicated 
by Congressional pressure pushing for cuts to the defense budget. The Mansfield Amendment, 
for instance, was an effort in the Senate to reduce US troops in Europe by fifty percent in 
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1971.145 The financial and domestic pressures were further complicated by pressure from the 
allies in NATO. Despite American efforts encouraging burden-sharing, the White House 
acknowledged that there was no evidence to believe such burden-sharing on the Europeans’ part 
was likely. Furthermore, any effort to withdraw troops would have been viewed by the allies as 
proof that the United States was not committed to the defense of Europe. Similarly, adopting a 
new strategy that favored increased conventional defense would cause the allies to question the 
United States’ role as nuclear deterrent.146 Surrounded with challenges from both sides, the 
administration was faced with no option but to reaffirm the existing policy of flexible response, 
despite their personal dislike of the policy.147 
Reaffirming the policy of flexible response then had to translate into action. NSDM 27 
announced that the United States would maintain its existing levels of forces in Europe in the 
immediate future. This commitment to existing troop levels was intended to show the European 
leaders that the United States was serious about the alliance and its commitment to the defense of 
Europe.148 This insistence on maintaining troop levels in Europe assumed an even more 
significant role in light of congressional opposition. In the case of the Mansfield Amendment, the 
president himself held a meeting with former government officials and military officers to 
discuss the Senate proposal. In the meeting, he encouraged everyone to remind the senators of 
the importance of supporting NATO. Despite the ultimate hopes of the United States to reduce 
forces and achieve détente, the president cautioned those in the meeting that “unilateral 
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withdrawal was not the way to do it.”149 The United States could not appear weak on NATO. To 
prevent its European partners from forming such an impression,, the United States took other 
steps to strengthen and reinforce the alliance. Defense efforts were upgraded “through the 
modernization of conventional forces” and steps were taken to improve NATO as a “mechanism 
for political consultation.”150 The Nixon administration had made its policy choice clear. The EC 
was not America’s preferred organization of cooperation and action with Europe; NATO was.  
All of these policy decisions had significant implications for American relations with its 
transatlantic allies. The Nixon administration’s reappraisal of European integration almost 
immediately alarmed leaders all across Europe. By the middle of 1970, many within Europe 
were questioning the United States’ position on EC enlargement. According to the UK’s Deputy 
Chief of the Mission to the EC, Kenneth Christofas, every member of the European Commission 
and all of the permanent representatives to the EC had asked him about the United States’ “true” 
position on the EC, and many of them had directly warned him that the US position was not as 
supportive as many believed.151 While Christofas noted that he did not give any credibility to the 
argument made by those at the EC and defended America’s support, that European leaders were 
questioning American support shows the extent to which relations were deteriorating. This 
growing distrust of the United States by its closest allies only continued to grow as America kept 
emphasizing the problems European integration posed for the US. After touring Europe in early-
November 1971, Secretary Laird reported to the president that, “it was very evident that doubt 
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and uncertainty are setting in rapidly in Europe in reaction to recent initiatives in foreign and 
economic affairs, as well as in reaction to the rhetoric emanating from the Congress.”152 He went 
on to explain this mentality and its origins. “Europeans see US initiatives, like our new China 
policy, . . . as abrupt course changes. They have been caught by surprise. Surprise has led to 
conjecture about additional course changes which might directly affect them.”153 Recent actions 
had even caused them to call into question the United States’ commitment to not withdraw 
troops in Europe, and the Germans in particular feared that the US might strike a deal on 
Mutually Beneficial Force Reductions (MBFR) with the Soviets without consulting Europe at 
all. Secretary Laird’s appraisal of relations was most worrisome. 
Laird was not the only American official to view matters this way, though. Without 
knowing the details of the memo from Laird to Nixon, Assistant Secretary Hillenbrand was 
preparing a report of his own on the state of US-European relations for Secretary Rogers. A 
foreboding message was evident from the memo’s start. “This memorandum . . . addresses a 
problem of increasing concern: European loss of confidence in the United States. While we have 
had crises of confidence before, they have not been of the same severity or depth.”154 
Hillenbrand noted the steps taken by the US to strengthen relations with Europe, including 
strengthening of NATO, increased consultation with the EC, support for EC expansion, and work 
toward a reduction of tensions. Yet, “in spite of these constructive demonstrations of our strong 
and continuing interest in Europe, it has become increasingly clear that we are entering a difficult 
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if not crucial period in our relations with that area.”155 As evidence of this lack of confidence, 
Hillenbrand noted that the French newspapers regularly discuss the “isolationist fever” running 
rampant in America, while Germany was advocating its own version of détente—Ostpolitik—
because they feared that America would withdraw from Europe.156 While Hillenbrand went on to 
suggest possible remedies to the solution, it appears that those suggestions fell on deaf ears. 
According to a telegram from NATO Ambassador David Kennedy to Secretary Rogers, 
America’s European allies had become concerned about the United States’ defense commitments 
to NATO.157 Kennedy went on to state, “Most important, and in large measure overriding 
everything else, there is concern regarding new direction US policy will take toward Europe.”158 
Kennedy’s letter of November 1972 bears striking resemblance to the remarks of Hillenbrand 
and Laird a year earlier. Despite having three years of warnings about the state of European 
relations, the fact of the matter remains—relations between the United States and Europe had 
been directly, and negatively affected by the American reappraisal of its policy on European 
integration.  
One might ask, however, just how far this deterioration of relations went in regard to 
America’s relations with its closest ally, the United Kingdom. As was observed in the previous 
chapter, President Nixon desired to maintain a close, special relationship with the British. In a 
meeting with the British Chancellor of the Exchequer Roy Jenkins in May 1969, the president 
argued “that recent developments in Europe [i.e. the resignation of De Gaulle] made even more 
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imperative the maintenance of a common ground between the U.S. and the U.K.”159 That Nixon 
desired to strengthen this relationship, particularly in the face of political uncertainties—as the 
expansion of the EC would be—should come as no surprise. Henry Kissinger famously asked, 
“Who do I call if I want to call Europe?”160 The facetious tone of Kissinger’s remark reveals the 
administration’s beliefs that it was impossible to negotiate with Europe on the whole. Instead, 
Nixon and his staff preferred to negotiate directly with the individual states. In this context, the 
special relationship can be seen as the logical outgrowth of skepticism toward European 
integration. By insisting on handling negotiations on disagreements arising as a result of EC 
expansion through personal communication with individual heads of government rather than 
with the EC as a whole, the special relationship was just the environment Nixon desired in order 
to prevent American interests from being overlooked.161 Yet, by the end of his first year in the 
White House, the special relationship seemed to be moving toward obscurity and insignificance 
in foreign affairs.  
As a component of the NSC’s study of British membership in the EC, a National 
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) was produced, analyzing the relationship between the US, Europe, 
and the Soviet Union. The findings of this report are telling for the status of the special 
relationship. The report noted that since the end of World War II, “the UK has sought to play a 
multiple role as a junior partner and principal advisor to the US, as the interpreter of Western 
Europe to the US and of the US to Western Europe, and as the spokesman of a multiracial 
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commonwealth with global interests.”162 Yet, despite efforts to wear multiple hats, the NIE 
concluded that it was now “impossible for the UK to sustain the varied and often contradictory 
positions inherent in these roles.”163 This left Britain with a choice to make concerning future 
policy—a choice that appeared to leave the special relationship behind. The NIE stated, “The 
‘special relationship’ with the US has lost much of its psychological hold and in any case no 
longer confers upon the UK any indispensable benefits.”164 Such a state of affairs seemed likely 
to doom Nixon’s attempts to revitalize and strengthen the special relationship; yet Nixon 
continued to try. He maintained cordial relations with Prime Minister Wilson, and upon Prime 
Minister Heath’s election, President Nixon made clear his intentions to maintain close 
communication and a special relationship. As has already been seen, though, Nixon’s offer to 
maintain the special relationship was countered by Heath’s cooler, more limited “natural 
relationship.”165 This statement should have alerted the president of things to come. In the very 
same conversation where Heath discussed his affinity for “natural relationship,” he went on to 
affirm the Britain had a desire to play a “world role.”166 For the British, the only way to play a 
role in world affairs was to do so as a member of Europe, not as a bedfellow of the United 
States.167 Heath would make this explicit in future conversations with his American counterpart. 
Speaking in December 1970, some six months after taking office, Heath informed Nixon “that 
Britain would not make any concessions to the United States’ view prior to going into the 
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Common Market, partly because they did not want to appear to be an American Trojan 
Horse.”168 He went on to state, “We can best defend your interests inside the Common Market 
and should not pay a price to you before we get in,” to which Nixon responded, “The problem is 
what price you are going to have to pay to get in.”169 Clearly tension was mounting between the 
two leaders. The question of priorities had come to the forefront, as Heath made it clear that the 
special relationship was less important to his government than British entry. No relationship, no 
matter how significant it had once been, would stand in the way of Britain’s return to the world 
stage as a member of Europe.  
Other American actions would continue to damage the special relationship as America 
reexamined its policy toward Europe. As has been noted, the British were among the many 
European states hesitant concerning détente. Heath began questioning whether the US was 
serious about its commitment to Europe. Concern developed to such an extent that Hillenbrand’s 
assessment of European relations paid special attention to the case of US-UK relations. Referring 
to it as the “so-called ‘special relationship,’” Hillenbrand remarked, “we find the Prime Minister 
[Heath] stressing that it is fortunate that Britain is moving toward Europe at a time when the US 
is becoming increasingly concerned with deep-seated problems at home and abroad.”170 That 
Heath was emphasizing its move toward Europe and distancing itself from the United States is a 
telling signal of the state of the special relationship. Yet, for all of the negativity focusing on the 
special relationship, one area of policy consistently remained special—nuclear cooperation, 
which remained close throughout the Nixon years. The US was Britain’s main supporter of its 
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Super Antelope missile improvement program during the initial stages. While being careful to 
not commit to assistance for the duration of the nuclear development program, the American 
support for the British initiative was largely the result of an enduring bilateral nuclear 
cooperation. 171 Thus, what emerges with regard to the special relationship by 1972 is a complex 
picture. The relationship was far from special in many ways, as the two parties sought different, 
incompatible goals with regard to political and economic policy. Regular communication and 
nuclear cooperation, however, left a glimmer of hope that the special relationship was not dead.  
The years 1969–72 mark a significant time period for American foreign policy toward 
Europe. The Nixon administration and his staff undertook a comprehensive reappraisal of its 
previous support for European integration. Acknowledging that America’s once unlimited 
support for European unity was no longer an adequate policy approach, public support soon took 
a qualified position. America continued to support integration and expansion, but it must be 
European-led. Furthermore, support was far more limited as the potentially economic 
implications began to outweigh the positives of political union in the minds of government 
officials, particularly in the minds of those in the Departments of Agriculture, Treasury, and 
Commerce who fought against the State Department’s insistence on political union as a positive. 
Thus, instead of granting unlimited support for European integration, the United States turned its 
attention to strengthening NATO, an organization that would allow continued American 
influence over important transatlantic issues. Despite its public reaffirmations of its 
commitments to Europe, the United States found itself in a troublesome environment. Domestic 
and foreign policy decisions had caused many of the European states to lose confidence in the 
United States. Even Great Britain—America’s special ally—began losing confidence, calling the 
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very nature of the special relationship into question. America had certainly changed its 




Making the Move: British Preparations for EC Entry, 1969–72 
 
While the United States was busily analyzing the cost of European integration for 
American strategic and economic interests and determining how to approach the issue, 
significant conversations were happening across the ocean, as similar questions were being 
raised within the halls of Britain’s House of Commons. MPs from both sides of the political 
spectrum hotly debated the implications of Britain joining the EC in terms of Britain’s role in the 
world, trade and industry, agriculture, and economic policy, to name a few. The debate raged 
inside the chambers of parliament and in the meetings of committees, yielding far from a 
universal consensus on the issue. The debate over British membership in the EC, however, is 
representative of a broader change occurring in global politics. As has already been 
demonstrated, the 1970s ushered in a new era in international relations as economics, foreign 
policy, and the rise of additional powers converged to yield a unique environment in the global 
Cold War. Facing an ally in the United States that appeared to be backing away from Europe, an 
economy that was struggling, and a former empire that placed increasing demands on the state, 
the United Kingdom had to decide what type of role it wanted to play on the world stage going 
forward. That decision would be forged only through hundreds of hours of intense debate, 
spanning weeks, months, and years. Yet, what emerges from this process is one clear 
realization—something had to change if Britain was to truly be a global power. The UK was 
poised to make a move.   
The story of UK’s candidacy to the European Community as told in chapter one ended 
with General de Gaulle’s death knell to EC negotiations over British entry in December 1967. 
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Despite the decision of the Six to end negotiations, the British did not withdraw their application. 
The Wilson government wanted to join the EC and Common Market, and was going to “patiently 
keep its application on the table and avoid going up side roads.”172 Wilson firmly believed that 
the “UK [was] on [the] main road, faced with a large road block, but this would not last 
forever.”173 The road he spoke of was his country’s integration with Europe,  securing Britain’s 
place once again within the world, while the roadblock was none other than General de Gaulle 
himself. Yet, when Prime Minister Wilson expressed these sentiments to President Nixon at the 
end of February 1969, he had no idea just how quickly that impediment to British entry would 
pass. Just two months later, Charles de Gaulle would resign the presidency of France, and 
Georges Pompidou would take the helm.174 The new president ushered in a new era in French 
politics—that of Post-De Gaulle France. The United States and UK were both keenly aware of 
the significance of this change in leadership. Pompidou expressed a willingness to change the 
“Gaullist foreign policy” in “both style and substance where the new team judges desirable.”175 
One of the most notable changes was his “less emotional, more businesslike approach to British 
entry to the Common Market.”176 This new approach meant removing the longstanding French 
veto of British accession, which was seen as “important and could in the long run result in both 
British entry and meaningful U.K.-French cooperation in European problems.”177 This 
significance was not lost on Harold Wilson. The prime minister viewed Pompidou as “solid but 
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unimaginative and lack[ing] de Gaulle’s flair.”178 To Wilson, Pompidou was a man willing to 
make sacrifices on certain issues in order to achieve policy victories in areas that he regarded 
most important. Wilson told Nixon that, “If British entry into the Common Market was the price 
that was necessary to get his agricultural accepted, Pompidou would be willing to pat it though 
he would prefer not to.”179 This change in the French government made Wilson hopeful again 
about the prospects of British entry into the EC. After acknowledging Pompidou’s willingness to 
accept British entry into the EC, Wilson informed Nixon that “talks on British entry will start in 
the first half of this year [1970].”180 Yet, the change in France was not all that caused Wilson to 
be hopeful of Britain’s prospects; a leadership change had also recently occurred in Germany. In 
late-September 1969, West Germany elected the Social Democrat Party to a majority in the 
Bundestag, elevating Willy Brandt to the chancellorship.181 Wilson and the British saw this 
change in leaders as “very favorable.”182 Calling him an “honest and subtle and much less tricky” 
man than former Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger, the British prime minister said that Brandt “may 
hold the pistol of agricultural policy to the French head.”183 He went on to note that as a result of 
French fears of Germany, “Britain may thus be back to its historic role of being solicited by the 
second strongest country on the Continent as a counterweight against the strongest one.”184 
Wilson’s hope for a return of Britain to its historic place of prominence within Europe and the 
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world appeared to be coming true. The prospects for British entry into the EC had never looked 
better to Wilson. 
Despite the prime minister’s desire to see Britain into the EC, and his optimism for the 
future, he was not to be the man to lead the United Kingdom into Europe. Domestic tensions 
increased, and a combination of economic and foreign affairs helped bring about a change in 
government in June 1970. The Conservative Party and its leader Edward Heath assumed the 
mantle of leadership. Having campaigned on visions of Britain’s future within the world and 
within Europe, the Heath administration saw its election as a mandate from the people of the UK 
in support of its plans to restore the nation’s prominence within Europe.185 Heath’s plan for 
Europe was to first and foremost resume negotiations. In advance of the election, Heath was 
careful not to make any broad promises about entering the EC out of concern for the cost to 
Great Britain. He promised merely to enter into negotiations, “no more, no less.”186 This was a 
promise Heath was confident he could keep. Having visited Paris and Berlin in May 1970 as a 
function of his role in the shadow cabinet, the new prime minister had become convinced of the 
same great prospects for entry that Wilson had. While acknowledging that some issues did 
remain that would make entry a bit slow, he knew that negotiations would at least be a reality.187 
Most importantly, though, Heath acutely understood that the issue of British entry into the EEC 
was one that was well beyond his control as prime minister; it was an issue that he knew 
belonged to Parliament. Only with parliamentary support could Britain enter into full 
negotiations, and only with parliament’s approval could the United Kingdom enter the EEC and 
ratify the accession treaty. For this reason, during a BBC election forum Heath promised the 
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people of Great Britain, “We will report the whole time to the country through Parliament what 
is going on in the negotiations. At the end when they see what has been negotiated, Parliament 
can judge completely whether it is in the interests of the country to go into the Common Market 
or not.”188 Heath and his government had made promises to the people. Having been elected on 
those promises, the new government must soon get to work fulfilling them if it hoped to advance 
its vision for Great Britain’s future.  
The first opportunity to begin the negotiation process occurred just days after the Heath 
government took office. The UK, Denmark, Norway, and Ireland (all of whom had applied for 
EEC membership), were invited to a meeting of the Six on June 30, 1970 to discuss the 
negotiation process. At that meeting, the government’s cabinet minister tasked with entry into 
the European Community—the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Lord Geoffrey Rippon—
outlined the plans for negotiation. The British wanted negotiations to move as quickly as 
possible, focusing only on matters essential to entry.189 Lord Rippon concluded his opening 
remarks in much the same way Edward Heath did in 1963—with complete affirmation of 
Britain’s whole-hearted support for European unity. He stated, “I have said enough today to 
show you that, like their predecessors, the British government is determined to work with you in 
uniting Europe in new spheres. . . . Our wish to join you derives from the sentiment which, as 
Europeans, we all share and from the idea we have of the part which our Continent should play 
in the world.”190 In light of this desire to move quickly toward unity, and emphasizing the 
European spirit within which the negotiations would occur, the British government accepted an 
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offer by the Six to begin negotiations at a bilateral Ministerial meeting on July 21.191 The July 21 
meeting discussed mostly the procedural components necessary for full negotiations to begin. 
While little of substance came from the meeting, Lord Rippon had been given considerable 
discretion by the Cabinet to act in accordance with what he saw as the best interests of the British 
and was authorized to inform the EEC ministers of the UK’s acceptance “in principle [of] the 
common agricultural policy of the EEC.”192 By establishing an acceptance to most of CAP at the 
initial ministerial meeting, the British were attempting to make the way easier for the future of 
negotiations. An acceptance in principle would allow them to focus merely on components of 
CAP rather than the idea of agricultural regulation on the whole. Yet, this meeting would only 
lay the groundwork. The real negotiations between the two parties began in October 1970. 
The negotiations between the UK and the EC illustrate an interesting dynamic. Some 
have argued that UK entry was a guarantee in 1970, while others have argued that failure was 
still a distinct possibility, as it had been in 1963 and 1967. Christopher Lord, a British political 
scientist specializing in the study of the European Union, argues, however, that neither of these 
positions is entirely accurate. According to Lord, the negotiations were in fact most likely to 
succeed, but there was a legitimate give and take between the Six and the UK as the negotiations 
helped shape the very nature of the community they hoped to create moving forward. The 
“conceptual prism through which each attempted to make some sense of a complex and uncertain 
problem” impacted these negotiations in a profound way.193 Approaching the negotiations in 
such a manner reflects the importance of the negotiations for each party involved, in terms of 
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building support for the agreement at home and preserving national interests. All of the states 
involved, particularly France and Great Britain, came to the table with distinct ideas of what 
mattered the most and what they hoped to achieve. These priorities and interests would prove 
problematic for genuine progress in the early months of negotiations.  
The main issues hindering negotiations from the time they began in late-October 1970 
were Britain’s contribution to the EC budget, Commonwealth Sugar Exports, New Zealand’s 
Dairy Imports, and the use of Sterling as a reserve currency. In terms of budgetary commitments, 
the British favored a longer, eight-year transition period, over which time the annual contribution 
would gradually increase from three percent to the full amount prescribed by the treaty. The 
French, however, favored a shorter transition period in which the British would begin by paying 
their initial share of the community’s GNP, twenty-one and a half percent. While the other five 
members of the EC were willing to compromise, France continued to hold the hard line, making 
it seem as if negotiations were soon to stall.194 Thus, in an attempt to prevent negotiations from 
stalling, the other five states suggested shifting the negotiations to the related issues of New 
Zealand dairy products and Commonwealth sugar. The switch proved to be of little use, 
however, as the French insistence on cessation of New Zealand dairy imports within five years, 
and the halving of sugar imports at twice the price were simply unacceptable to the British. 
When the five suggested a compromise closer to what the British actually hoped to achieve, it 
was met with quick French resistance.195 Despite having middle little progress on the substantive 
matters of entry into the Common Market, Lord Rippon announced in March 1971 that he and 
the British government hoped for a conclusion of negotiations by May. The British, from the 
outset, had been committed to a quick negotiation over essentials, preferring to work out less 
                                                 




important issues and specifics once in the EC.196 The French, however, again caused the issue to 
slow down. Pompidou and his government became insistent upon solving the issue of sterling 
liabilities before the British could enter. Since the sterling pound was an international reserve 
currency and the British government held large balances, this issue was inherently complex. The 
British knew it would take months to resolve these questions at the rate negotiations had been 
going, and their hopes of entry into the EC would be doomed by more failed negotiations.197 
With this in mind, Heath took matters into his own hands. Negotiations could not continue 
stalling. 
Heath had learned from his past experience as head of the British delegation during the 
1963 negotiations, and was keenly aware that “the barrier to a successful outcome was political, 
not technical, and could therefore be removed only by agreement at the highest level.”198 Thus, 
after months of planning between British Ambassador to France Christopher Soames and 
Pompidou’s private secretary Michel Jobert, the two European statesmen Pompidou and Heath 
announced on May 8, 1971 that they would be meeting for a summit in Paris at the end of the 
month to discuss the status of negotiations and attempt to resolve the disagreements between the 
two states. The announcement of this head of government meeting had almost immediate effect. 
At the Brussels ministerial meeting held May 11-12, progress was made on the issues of sugar, 
agriculture, and tariff quotas, as all parties were determined to use the ministerial meeting as a 
precursor to a successful summit. With progress now seemingly underway, Heath eagerly 
anticipated the meeting with Pompidou and the hope that it provided for successful entry. Upon 
arriving in Paris, Heath immediately met the French President. For his part, Pompidou wasted no 
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time in their first one-on-one session; as far as he was concerned, the British could only join the 
EC if a “historic change in the British attitude” occurred.199 Pompidou firmly believed that the 
addition of Great Britain would enhance and strengthen the EC, but only if the British underwent 
a fundamental change in their alliance orientation. Heath knew what this meant. He assured the 
French premier that “there could be no special partnership between Britain and the United States, 
even if Britain wanted it, because one was barely a quarter the size of the other. Through Europe, 
on the other hand, such a partnership was possible within a Community applying the same rules 
and working to shared principles.”200 Heath made his position clear. The French feared a United 
Kingdom in the EC that was merely a puppet of the United States, but Heath reassured 
Pompidou that the British were willing to sacrifice its special relationship with the United States 
(which he seemed to believe was not a genuine relationship in the first place) in order to join 
Europe. First and foremost, the British were committed to Europe. Over the next two days, Heath 
would continue to hammer this point home with his French counterpart. He saw his primary task 
as convincing the French of Britain’s genuine desire to join Europe.201 Through twelve hours of 
negotiations and conversations, the two men discussed the various issues that divided them and 
what it would take for them to agree upon terms of entry. What emerged was a spirit of 
negotiation and compromise and a new appreciation for the interests of the other. Perhaps 
nothing summarizes the Paris summit better than Pompidou’s closing remarks at the joint press 
conference at the summit’s end. He stated: 
Many people believed that Great Britain was not and did not wish to become European, 
and that Britain wanted to enter the Community only so as to destroy it or to divert it 
from its objectives. Many people also though that France was ready to use every pretext 
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to place in the end a fresh veto on Britain’s entry. Well, ladies and gentlemen, you see 
before you tonight two men who are convinced of the contrary.202 
 
This statement from Pompidou shows just how far the negotiations and conversations had come. 
The “historic change in the British attitude” that Pompidou felt necessary for the British to enter 
the EC had indeed occurred, actually long before that meeting on May 20. The Heath 
administration had already made a commitment to join Europe when it campaigned in the 1970 
parliamentary elections. When Heath was able to convince the French of that genuine change, 
the road to accession got much smoother.203 
Coming off of the successful summit with the French, the British entered the June 
negotiations with a renewed vigor. That attitude met its match in the French counterpart. 
President Pompidou sent a delegation to Brussels with instructions to “water down” their 
demands and dogmatic positions.204 This allowed the negotiations to come to a quick conclusion. 
In the end, the British accepted an agreement to establish their budgetary commitments at eight 
and sixty-four hundredths percent initially, increasing to eighteen and one half percent over five 
years. They also negotiated a settlement on the issue of New Zealand dairy products that would 
allow access to eighty percent of its butter quotas and twenty percent of its cheese quotas, all of 
which was approved by the government. In terms of sugar exports, the negotiating teams came to 
an agreement that the member states of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement found 
acceptable.205 The only remaining point of contention was the issue of British sterling. On this 
point, the French were willing to make some concessions on when this issue was to be decided. 
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The British agreed to a “gradual run down of official sterling balances after our accession.”206 
The French interpreted this as a step in the right direction, and accepted the British offer to work 
out the details of the monetary policy after accession. With that, negotiations had been 
concluded. While the terms of negotiation were less than either Britain or France had ultimately 
hoped for securing, Christopher Lord argues that the final terms allowed both the French and 
British to feel that they had achieved their goals in negotiating.207 The compromise terms were 
acceptable. Just how acceptable, however, was for Parliament to decide. 
Edward Heath had made it clear from the beginning that the decision to enter Europe was 
not one for him or his cabinet to make, but the people through their representatives in Parliament 
had to be polled. Timing, however, was not on the side of Heath and his government. By June 
1971, public opinion had become increasingly hostile to British entry in the EC. According to a 
May 1971 Gallup poll, less than one-fourth of England’s citizens favored entry into the EC. Even 
more troubling for the government, though, was that the survey found that some fifty-nine 
percent actually opposed British accession to the Common Market.208 The situation did not look 
much better in Parliament. Wilson and his Labour Party were firmly opposed to British entry in 
the EC according to the terms the Heath government had negotiated. Some 125 Labour MPs 
were ardent opponents, and in the event that the Labour Party were to formally declare its 
opposition to British entry as a component of party ideologies, party leaders felt confident that 
only thirty to sixty of the 285 Labour MPs would vote with Heath or abstain.209 Furthermore, a 
poll taken by London’s Sunday Times in May found that approximately seventy Torries and 
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roughly thirty to forty members of Heath’s own Conservative Party were opposed to entry.210 
Facing limited public support and a sizeable opposition in the House of Commons, the Heath 
government made what it felt to be the best decision—not to rush the vote. They released a 
White Paper on July 7 outlining the terms of the negotiation and officially stating the 
government’s position on the issue and its reasons for support. Instead of then voting on the 
whole issue before the summer recess, which began in early August, Heath opted to hold a 
debate over the White Paper only by the end of July. This decision allowed Heath and his cabinet 
to sure up their position and strengthen their base within Parliament.211 
Debate over the government’s white paper proved to be filled with rhetorical fireworks 
and intense arguments. The White Paper—which also appeared in a short version—stated, “Her 
Majesty’s Government is convinced that our country will be more secure and our people and our 
industries more prosperous if we join the European Community than if we remain outside.”212 
This basic premise was the main point of contention during the debate—as both sides sought to 
prove or disprove the idea that Britain would be better served within the rest of Europe. When 
discussion began on July 21, the Prime Minister announced that this “exploratory debate” was 
the first step in finalizing a process that had been ten years in the making.213 Heath stressed the 
importance of industrial and economic factors, security and defense factors, and political factors 
as the main reasons the United Kingdom should join the rest of Europe, and concluded that the 
government had been able to secure the best terms possible, making the entry of the UK into the 
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EEC a real possibility.214 The opposition soon began to raise objections, and the Leader of the 
Opposition, former Prime Minister Harold Wilson, was among the most vocal. Yet, much of 
what Wilson said in his initial remarks was political pandering, intended to undercut the position 
of the government. For the Labour Party, the entire move toward Europe was seen as a domestic 
strategy being orchestrated by the Conservatives to retain power.215 This mentality is reflected in 
Wilson’s opposition and his attempts to show that he had only favored entry under the most 
favorable terms to the British.216 Wilson ultimately concluded that the terms agreed to by the 
Conservative government were in fact not acceptable, particularly on the issue of New Zealand 
dairy imports, citing as evidence the New Zealand Labour Party’s opposition to the agreement, 
despite the acquiescence of the country’s government to the measures.217 Yet, perhaps most 
telling of Wilson’s remarks during the debate is the extent to which this issue, like others, 
became a matter of party politics, showing the shortcomings of the opponent rather than the true 
best interest for Britain. Wilson ended his speech by discussing how Heath’ economic 
prescriptions to spur recovery had failed, prompting the government to turn entry into the EC as 
the only means by which Britain could succeed in becoming a strong nation again. Wilson set 
himself in clear contrast to this alleged wrong path by reiterating that strong policies from a 
strong government would solve this problem and make Britain as strong outside the EC as it 
would inside.218 This was truly at the heart of the issue for Wilson and the opposition.  
Debate over the white paper raged on for four days. The two sides continued to debate 
the pros and cons of membership, the motivations for membership, and the broader question of 
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how Britain should move forward to assume its former place of prominence on the world stage. 
The two continued to vehemently disagree over the terms of the negotiation and whether they 
were acceptable. Yet, for all of their bickering, the opposing groups were not as diametrically 
opposed to the terms, as the debate record may make it seem. In the final remarks of the entire 
white paper debate, the Conservative Home Secretary Reginald Maudling described the real 
situation aptly. “Everyone knows perfectly well, as is evidenced by Ministers of the previous 
Government who know most about these things, that these are the best terms that any 
government could have expected to get. If they are now saying that the terms are not acceptable, 
the entire enterprise of trying to enter themselves was bogus from the start.”219 Maudling’s point 
is quite telling. Wilson and his government knew what terms were possible. They were aware of 
the challenges and difficulties faced in negotiations. They knew that better terms could not have 
been achieved, and certainly could not be achieved by going back to the negotiation table. The 
British deal in 1971 was the best set of terms the UK had seen, and any arguing over the terms 
themselves was largely a matter of British political fighting. With the debate on the White Paper 
concluded, the stage was set for a show down in October when the full question was put to the 
floor. 
As October neared, Heath and his Conservative party began gearing up for the fateful 
vote. Fully aware of the significance of this vote for the future of Great Britain, Heath went to 
great lengths to ensure the vote would be successful. After consultation with the Conservative 
Party’s Chief Whip, the decision was made to have a free vote. Fully aware that there were those 
in every party who both supported and opposed British entry, a free vote would allow each MP 
to cast a ballot according to their own beliefs rather than their party’s official stance. Heath was 
                                                 




determined to take advantage of any and all support he could get.220 When the debate opened on 
October 21, 1971, the momentous importance of the decision was felt throughout the chamber. 
Heath recalled feeling “the tremendous weight of responsibility as [he] stood at the despatch box. 
No Prime Minister in time of peace [had] ever asked the House to take such a positive and 
historic decision as [he] was asking it to do that night. The world was watching Britain to see 
whether Parliament would decide that Western Europe would move along the path to real 
unity.”221 While Heath’s own perspective on this climax is perhaps a bit self-glorifying, it does 
show the significance of the debate. The question being decided by parliament in October 1971 
was a question about more than the future of Great Britain; it was about the future of Europe and 
the Western world on the whole. This made the debate even more intense and hotly contested.  
Sir Alec Douglas-Home formally put the question of European membership to the house 
at 4:00 PM, October 21, 1971. He moved, “That this House approves her Majesty’s 
Government’s decision of principle to join the European Communities on the basis of the 
arrangements which have been negotiated.”222 The foreign secretary went on to state in his 
defense of the position that after all of the steps taken by parliament (i.e. the debates during the 
preceding decade over British membership in the EC), the reputation of the UK “as a nation for 
reliable dealing would be looked upon, either in Europe or in the world,” in a negative light if the 
House were to decide not to go forward and enter the EEC.223 Home went on to explain in great 
detail the role Britain would play within the EC, paying special attention to its safeguards of 
sovereignty and the economic benefits and implications—both of which would be significant 
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issues in the debate. In fact, the issue of sovereignty became a key issue for many in the Labour 
Party, as they equated the Conservative’s lack of discussion about it in the White Paper as 
evidence of a tremendous loss for Britain.224 As was seen during the White Paper debate, the 
discussion over British entry into the EC was inherently about Britain’s role in world affairs. 
When viewed in this light, the issue of the state’s political sovereignty becomes a major point of 
contention. But the economic implications of British membership, also addressed during the 
summer, reemerged in this discussion. Perhaps the biggest contention revolved around two 
competing white papers that had been circulated in recent years. Wilson’s Labour Government 
had issued a white paper on British EEC membership in early-1970 when negotiations resumed. 
In that document, the Labour government/s estimate of the economic costs to the UK was far 
higher than the one subsequently suggested in the Conservative government’s own white paper 
from July 1971. Since the two documents came from the two opposing parties, the question was 
whether either one has miscalculated or had simply instrumentalized the issue. This discrepancy 
between the two assessments would essentially create a stalemate between those in favor of entry 
and those opposed to it.225 
The debate raged on for six long days, often occurring for extended periods of time at 
once and running until the late hours of the night and into the wee hours of the next morning. 
Over the course of the debate, more than 200 MPs wished to speak on the issue of British entry 
in the EC, with the list growing each day. After three days, the Speaker of the House had only 
been able to call sixty-nine of the 255 that wished to speak.226 Yet despite the length and extent 
of the debate, few new points were brought up. Many MPs who spoke on the topic addressed 
                                                 
224 Ibid., col. 976–80. 
225 Ibid., col. 1016–22. 
226 Ibid., col. 1480. 
 
77 
concerns expressed by others, while some discussed minor points relevant to how entry would 
help or hurt their particular constituency—depending on their perspective.227 And yet for all of 
the heated disagreements and great numbers of MPs desiring to speak, the two largest figures in 
the House of Commons—the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition—were largely 
silent throughout most of the debate. It was only on the last day that Harold Wilson and Edward 
Heath rose to speak. When given the opportunity, Wilson repeated many of the same points he 
had made during his White Paper debate speech—there was not full support for entry among the 
citizens of the UK, the agreements on sugar and New Zealand exports are not adequate, and the 
economic costs to Great Britain upon entering the EC (namely through CAP). Wilson contended 
that while his government had tried to lead Great Britain into Europe, it had been on a 
commitment to acceptable terms. For him and many within the Labour Party, the terms of 
negotiation secured by the Heath Government were simply not acceptable and would be 
detrimental to the UK.228  
The final words, however, belonged to the Prime Minister. At 9:30 PM, Heath 
approached the despatch box and began his defense for membership in the EC, directly 
responding to the points raised by Wilson. Concerning the economic arguments presented, Heath 
noted that the most important economic matter was whether the UK would be in a position to 
influence economic decisions in the future, a position he believed was only possible within the 
EC.229 Concerning the terms, Heath noted that they had been previously discussed at great 
lengths and were “better than anyone thought possible when the negotiations began,” a point that 
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was “widely recognised in Europe.”230 The Prime Minister continued by stating that many had 
approached the debate by trying to balance the advantages and disadvantages to achieve certainty 
about the decision. Heath noted that such certainty was never possible in international affairs, but 
that the uncertainty should not hinder Britain from moving forward with its membership in the 
EC.231 Heath concluded by putting the decision into its broader context, which is where the 
question truly belonged. British entry into the EC would affect far more than those living in the 
UK. Its impact would be felt in all of Western Europe and by millions of people across the 
world. It truly was a question with global implications. That Heath genuinely believed this is 
evidenced in the final words of the debate. “But tonight when this House endorses this Motion, 
many millions of people right across the world will rejoice that we have taken our rightful place 
in a truly United Europe.”232 With those words, the question was put, and the motion passed by a 
vote of 356-224.233 The House of Commons had voted for Britain to finally enter the European 
Community. The House of Lords responded similarly, with an overwhelming vote of 451-58.234 
The Heath Government had truly won a massive victory in achieving its main foreign policy 
goal. 
With Parliamentary approval, the treaty of accession was formally drawn up between the 
two parties. On Saturday, January 22, 1972, Prime Minister Edward Heath, accompanied by Sir 
Alec Douglas-Home, Lord Rippon, former Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, and others, arrived 
at the Palais d’Egmont in Brussels, where they formally signed the treaties of accession. This 
was, in many ways, the culmination of a long process toward European integration. This is 
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evidenced through the attendance of two long-time proponents of European unity—former 
Belgian Prime Minister Paul-Henri Spaak and the architect of European unity, Jean Monnet.235 
For all those involved in the British treaty signing, the day represented a major step forward, but 
as Heath and his team were well aware, there still remained one final hurdle to jump before the 
UK was firmly situated within the EC—the ratification of the accession bill. 
Opposition within the House of Commons had previously tried to stall the signing of the 
treaty by introducing a resolution in Parliament on January 20, 1972 that would force the 
government to produce a copy of the treaty for Parliament to approve before it was signed.236 
The government quickly pointed out that such action was impossible since no treaty can be 
produced as a binding agreement until it has been signed and given legal authority. Forced to 
acknowledge the legality of the government’s position, a vote of Parliament acknowledged that 
the accession treaty would have to be distributed to the House of Commons immediately after its 
signing for final approval.237 In light of the mandate to immediately produce the treaty, Lord 
Rippon informed the House on January 24 that the bill would be printed the following day.238  
The European Communities Bill (ECB) was a fairly remarkable piece of legislation. 
Harold Wilson and others in the Labour Party had expected a massive bill that would be easily 
stalled, thus preventing it from being voted upon; such was not to be the case. The final ECB was 
a thirty-seven page document that outlined the provisions of the treaty itself and the changes to 
British law that were necessary to bring the UK into accordance with the Community’s statutes. 
The bill authorized the House to pass legislation necessary to implement Community policies 
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that both directly and indirectly affected internal operations of the UK; specified that 
“Community law will be superior to other law in this country;” and outlined the specific changes 
to British law that must be made to fulfill existing Community regulations and policies.239 The 
bill, which was approved by the cabinet on January 17, 1972, was introduced in the House of 
Commons and read for the first of its three times on January 25.240 
Of the three required readings of the ECB, the second reading was by far of the most 
importance for the fate of the bill. It was during the second reading, which lasted from February 
15-17, that the bill came closest to defeat.241 Most of the contention during the second reading 
debate was merely a reiteration of issues discussed in the accession debate. In fact, Lord Rippon 
responded to the objections raised to the bill by Labour MP Peter Shore by asking, “Does not the 
right hon. Gentleman realise that all his speech so far is a reiteration of what some other right 
hon. and hon. Members opposite said during the debate which ended on 28th October?”242 Yet for 
others, such as Harold Wilson, the primary concern was not the terms of the agreement that had 
since been debated, but rather the political implications for the UK. Wilson was concerned about 
what the ECB would do to the political integrity of Great Britain. The brevity of the bill angered 
him, since he felt such a short bill failed to provide the adequate legislative review needed to 
enact such sweeping changes to British law. Similarly, he felt that the ability of the Community 
to change its statutes—and thus change British statutes and laws because of the primacy clause—
was a complete surrender of British sovereignty and against all standards of British legislative 
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procedure.243 The issue of sovereignty continued to loom large. When placed within a broader 
context of where Great Britain stands in the world, then a loss of sovereignty signals that Britain 
will never be able to independently stand on its own as a world power. These concerns over the 
surrender of sovereignty, which had been a touchstone of opposition to EC membership from the 
beginning, had not dissipated because Britain had agreed in principle to join the rest of Europe. 
Yet such opposition was not to go without comment from the government; the Prime 
Minister directly responded to the statements made by Wilson. Concerning the question of 
sovereignty—which was the essential question of the opposition and was at the heart of Wilson’s 
claims about the unconstitutionality of the ECB—Heath noted that everyone involved in the 
debate over European policy had been aware that sovereignty was the question at hand from the 
very beginning of the process. Joining Europe meant necessarily ceding some of the traditional 
sovereignty of the state, and in particular changing the way the House of Commons operated.244 
It is this point that bears emphasizing. For Heath, the question of sovereignty was not one to be 
overly concerned with, although those in his own party who opposed membership viewed the 
loss of sovereignty as the main reason for such opposition.245 Heath, Rippon, and other 
government officials saw sovereignty as the ability to exercise choice and assert one’s opinions. 
Outside of Europe, those abilities were severely limited.246 The special relationship with the 
United States was such that the British could not exercise choice freely when American opinion 
differed, and its position outside of Europe limited it from making choices of any significance at 
the continental level.247 When placed within such a context, the question of sovereignty was not 
                                                 
243 Ibid., col. 639–47. 
244 Ibid., col. 743–44. 
245 Lord, 102. 




gravely important. For Heath, the challenge moving forward was not to prevent a minor loss of 
state power but to instead adapt to the changes and use the power of the British government to 
influence actions not just in Britain, but also in Europe as a whole.248 This adaptation of 
sovereignty to making choices that had greater significance placed British sovereignty on a 
larger, regional—and even global—stage. As Niklas Rossbach argues, that renewed global 
prominence, after all, was what had always motivated Heath’s emphasis on British entry in the 
EEC.249 Yet, Heath knew that despite his defense of the ECB and his response to the question of 
sovereignty and global prominence, the opposition remained strong. The prime minister thus 
ended his speech with a threat to dissolve parliament and call for new elections if the House 
failed to approve the second reading of the bill, whose substance it had already approved the 
previous October. With Heath’s words fresh in their minds, the house immediately voted to 
approve the second reading by the slimmest majority of any previous vote concerning British 
membership in the EC—309-301.250 
Following the second reading the bill entered the committee stage, where it spent several 
months. During the committee process, some 200 amendments were considered to the bill, 
reflecting the opposition within the House. Despite the sheer volume of amendments considered, 
none of them passed. The ECB eventually made it out of the committee stage after 178 hours of 
debate. The third and final reading of the bill happened on July 13, 1972. After six hours of 
debate, Lord Rippon closed with a few words of Lord Salisbury from 1888. “We belong to a 
great community of nations and we have no right to shrink from the duties which the interests of 
the Community impose upon us. . . We are part of the Community of Europe and we must do our 
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duty as such.”251 With these words, and a challenge to “walk tall into Europe on 1st January 
1973,” the question was put and the House of Commons approved the third reading and passed 
the European Communities Bill by a vote of 301-284. 252 Having been approved by Parliament, 
the queen gave royal assent to the Bill on October 17, 1972.253 The matter was finally put to rest; 
the United Kingdom would become a full member of the European Community on January 1, 
1973. 
The British efforts to join the European Community were far from smooth. The process 
had begun in 1961 and only concluded in 1972. The third, and final, attempt alone had been an 
excruciatingly difficult process. The way was made easier by some political changes in Europe, 
but the process of entry required sacrificing the special relationship to a large degree and sparked 
intense debate at home. Parliament spent some forty-nine days from 1971–72 discussing the 
question of entry into the EC, representing more than 300 hours of debate.254 The debates in 
Parliament illustrated just how important the issue of Britain’s place within the world truly was 
to those within the UK. The question was not just a matter of entering Europe, but how Britain 
would move forward into a place of prominence. For Heath and the Conservatives, that future 
was as a part of Europe; for Wilson and the Labour Party, that future could not be achieved by 
sacrificing British sovereignty. These questions were inevitably tied together, particularly in the 
mind of Heath, who believed that sacrificing sovereignty was not necessarily a bad thing if it 
meant gaining increased power to act. In the end, Heath’s vision for Great Britain as a part of 
Europe won out. Britain’s new role in the world had been decided. No longer were the British 
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trying to wear multiple hats in the international arena by catering to the US, Commonwealth, and 
Europe; they were clearly situating themselves within Europe, looking forward to a bright new 
future and a return to global prominence.255 Britain had made its move, and only time would tell 
what that move meant for international relations.  
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“The Crucial Year:” Full Entry and the Year of Europe 
 
In his 2009 book Kissinger, historian Alistair Horne dubbed 1973 “the crucial year.”256 
As Horne observed, “Any which way you looked at it, by any criterion—and this was not 
peculiarly related to Henry Kissinger’s role in it—1973 was not an ordinary year.”257 Andreas 
Killen made a similar argument for the significance of 1973 in his book 1973 Nervous 
Breakdown: Watergate, Warhol, and the Birth of Post-Sixties America. For Killen, what 
separated 1973 from the other years of the decade were Watergate, an American defeat in 
Vietnam, and a collapsing economy; 1973 was pivotal for the way it changed American culture 
more than anything else.258 What Horne understands about 1973 that Killen missed, however, is 
that 1973 was crucial not just because of how American social and political culture was changed, 
but because of how American foreign policy was changed. When 1973 began, the Nixon 
administration was not yet plagued by investigations on Watergate; other issues remained on the 
forefront that concerned the president and his chief foreign policy advisor.259 They had made 
great progress in 1972, and having been reelected in a landslide, the Nixon team was now ready 
to “continue progress on those fronts while turning to issues that needed more attention,” notably 
including relations with Europe.260 The foreign policy of the first administration had made great 
strides, but they had come with heavy costs. As has already been shown, relations with Europe 
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were, at best, strained and deteriorating by 1973. As Nixon observed in his 1973 Foreign Policy 
Report to Congress, “European unity which we had always encouraged, was raising new issues 
in Atlantic relations.”261 Everyone in the administration agreed; something needed to be done to 
repair transatlantic relations.  
While the United States was busily trying to figure out how to repair its strained relations 
with Europe, the Europeans were adapting to the new realities of an expanded Community. The 
EC had grown from six to nine, and with that new challenges emerged. The more unified Europe 
was becoming more important as an entity of its own. The traditional relationship with the 
United States now took on greater significance as the economic and political power of an 
integrated Europe leveled the playing field between the two to the greatest degree since the end 
of World War II. These new challenges and politics of community expansion acutely affected the 
United Kingdom. They created a new framework through which the British would have to act in 
foreign policy; navigating the delicate balance of community membership and the special 
relationship would be no easy task under the best of circumstances. American efforts to improve 
relations with Europe would only further complicate matters. By December 1972, the Foreign 
and Commonwealth office had concluded, “1973 is going to be a busy and difficult year for 
US/Europe relations in all their aspects.”262 If the special relationship was going to survive what 
had already become a perilous situation, 1973 would have to see an end to deteriorating 
relations. With both the United States and Europe trying to figure out how to move forward in 
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their relations with the other, 1973 was bound to bring about significant changes and new 
policies. Horne was correct; 1973 was most certainly “not an ordinary year.” 
On January 1, 1973, Britain formally became a full member of the European Community. 
The final entry of the UK into the EC was marked with great celebration. For Heath, this was “a 
wonderful new beginning and a tremendous opportunity for the British people.”263 To 
commemorate the cultural significance of British entry as well as the political significance, 
Heath organized a three-day event featuring a series of performances by actors, poets, and 
musicians from the UK and Europe, which he entitled “Fanfare for Europe.”264 Yet, the public 
fanfare and celebration was merely one portrayal of what British membership in the EC meant. 
Privately, the government had a new challenge ahead of them. British officials had “to learn to 
live as members, not as applicants for membership.”265 This task would be easier said than done. 
Heath instructed each of his cabinet departments to familiarize themselves with the procedures 
and policies of the EC, and called upon the cabinet members to set the objectives of their given 
departments and figure out how to make those objectives work in the complexities of community 
membership.266 Beyond the organizational challenges of adapting to membership, “living as 
members” also meant making changes to foreign policy. As early as mid-December 1972, Heath 
had expressed concern over speaking to the United States individually about issues where the 
Community had an express policy. He believed that the only way to ensure the success of an 
equal relationship between the US and EC was to maintain a united front on European policies, 
namely in the areas of trade and the international monetary system.267 Clearly, it would be 
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necessary to alter the existing approach to foreign relations. Speaking freely about any and all 
issues would no longer be the course of action. These challenges of adapting to new policies at 
home and abroad would soon come to the forefront.  
Changing approaches to foreign policy were not unique to Great Britain; the Nixon 
administration was ready to embark upon a change of its own. In a 1972 briefing by the State 
Department, the Secretary’s office informed President Nixon, “To carry out US objectives we 
must get Europe’s attention. This might well require a presidential initiative.”268 A presidential 
initiative is exactly what Nixon and Kissinger had in mind. 1973 was to be the “Year of Europe.” 
The phrase “Year of Europe” began to emerge in American political rhetoric as early as 
September 1972 to describe American policy aims towards Europe.269 Yet despite its usage late 
in 1972, it would not be until early 1973 that any real steps were taken toward implementation of 
the Year of Europe. The official opening of the Year of Europe occurred at the end of January 
when Heath made an official visit to Washington to meet with the president. During that 
meeting, Nixon and Kissinger took advantage of their time with Heath to float the idea of a Year 
of Europe, or, as Andrew Scott observes, to “test the water without stirring the ocean.”270 Over 
the course of Heath’s visit, the two American statesmen discussed the suspicion and resentment 
felt in the US toward the EC and expressed hope that a solution could be achieved through 
mutual cooperation of the two longtime allies.271 This hope for improved Atlantic relations led 
by a coordinated Anglo-American cooperation was a calculated move. Kissinger later recalled: 
“That we should choose Britain for the first of these consultations was natural; it was the essence 
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of what was still called the ‘special relationship.’ For generations successive administrations had 
synchronized their moves with London, especially over the Atlantic Alliance.”272 Nixon and 
Kissinger felt that the special relationship was still an important part of American-European 
relations. Positive relations with Europe would only be successful if the United States continued 
to have a uniquely close ally within Europe. Unfortunately for the American hopes, Heath did 
not share their feelings. He “preferred a leading position in Europe to an honored advisory role in 
Washington, and he did not consider the two functions compatible.”273 Given his desire to 
distance himself from the United States, it should come as no surprise that he was hesitant to 
accept the American vision of a revived Atlantic Alliance. Instead, the British increasingly felt 
deeply skeptical toward the success of an overarching plan to resolve the existing transatlantic 
issues.274 The United States had tested the waters with its closest ally and had found them to be 
cool. 
Despite the reserved initial response from the British, the United States decided to move 
forward with the Year of Europe on a grand scale. In a speech to the Associated Press on April 
23, 1973, Henry Kissinger catapulted the Year of Europe into the global spotlight. That address 
not only defined the administration’s transatlantic approach, but also formally cemented the 
phrase in the vocabulary of American foreign policy. In that speech, Kissinger announced that a 
new era had emerged in European-American relations; the experiences of World War II had been 
replaced by a revitalized Europe and competing national identities. As a result, he advocated a 
renewal of the commitment between the US and its allies in the form of a new “Atlantic Charter” 
that would coordinate the policies of the two groups. The national security advisor went on to 
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express America’s continued support for European unity and its commitment to the defense of 
Europe.275 Having received a less than desirable response to the initiative from the British, 
Kissinger left it to historians to discern why he and Nixon decided to move forward with the 
speech. Geir Lundestad and Thomas Schwartz, argue that the speech represented a genuine effort 
on the part of the administration to improve relations with Western Europe.276 Such motives for 
the speech are indeed likely, since the administration had expected the initiative to be a 
resounding success. As Kissinger observed, “Neither Nixon nor I expected controversy. We 
thought we were ushering in a period of creativity in the Atlantic partnership.”277 Other scholars, 
however, such as Andrew Scott and Robert Dallek, believe that the speech was a calculated 
move intended to distract from the gathering storm of Watergate.278 Yet regardless of which 
intention Kissinger had when he delivered the speech, one thing is certain—what he actually 
achieved with his remarks was very different than what he had hoped. 
 The speech had come largely as a surprise to America’s allies. The European capitals 
had received only limited notice of Kissinger’s intent to announce the Year of Europe initiative 
in his speech at the AP editors’ luncheon, and the administration had requested the European 
governments give “strong public backing” for Kissinger’s proposal.279 As Daniel Möckli 
observes, the EC member states felt the initiative had been announced without adequate 
consultation, and came at a particularly difficult time for Europe. The Community had just 
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finished its first round of expansion and had recently increased its efforts to implement the 
economic and monetary union, as well as to foster enhanced European political cooperation.280 
Thus, the EC was preoccupied with its own affairs, limiting its ability to fully address 
Kissinger’s proposals. Furthermore, the timing problem was further exacerbated by 
developments at home. Ehrlichman and Haldeman, Nixon’s two top aides, resigned just a week 
later in the midst of the quickly developing Watergate scandal.281 Watergate would continue to 
plague the success of the Year of Europe, as even those in Europe who were sympathetic to the 
American initiative were less likely to reach out to the beleaguered and scandal-plagued Nixon 
administration.282 The timing of Kissinger’s speech could not have been worse.  
Poor timing was the least of Kissinger’s worries, however. In his speech, he had made 
some unfortunate statements for the future of American-European relations. The first of those 
statements concerned the outlook of the two powers. In what he felt was a good formulation of 
the different perspectives of the US and Europe, Kissinger stated, “The United States has global 
interests and responsibilities. Our European allies have regional interests. These are not 
necessarily in conflict, but in the new era neither are they necessarily identical.”283 The 
implications of Kissinger’s statement were clear; he had relegated Europe to the status of a 
regional power, in contrast to the global power of the United States. Such an approach to 
Europe’s place within the world is only logical, however. As was discussed in Chapter Two, one 
of the fundamental differences between the United States and Great Britain—and Western 
Europe more broadly—was that the US saw the geopolitical landscape transitioning from a 
bipolar to a tripolar world, while the UK and the rest of the continent saw the development of a 
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multipolar world. Such a statement was sure to attract criticism from across the Atlantic. The 
second misstep Kissinger made in the minds of the European heads of government was 
concerning support for European integration. In his speech, Kissinger stated that the United 
States did not view European unity as an end in itself, and would continue to support it as “a 
component of a larger Atlantic partnership.”284 By relegating European unity to the role of 
another aspect of transatlantic relations, Kissinger confirmed what many Europeans had long 
known—the United States did not truly support European unity because it threatened both the 
existing order of the transatlantic alliance, as well as the nature of global geopolitics.285 Thus, 
since the Nixon administration genuinely believed that Europe’s role in the global Cold War 
conflict was within the Atlantic alliance while Europe saw the expanded EC and détente as 
opportunities to position itself as an independent global actor, it is of little surprise that Kissinger 
would quickly come to regret this statement.286 
Initial European responses to the Year of Europe speech quickly began to emerge in the 
foreign offices, embassies, and capitals across Atlantic region. One of the first countries to 
respond was West Germany. The United States had a tense relationship with West Germany, 
both at the state and personal levels. Nixon and Kissinger had been wary of West German 
Chancellor Willie Brandt for some time because of his Ostpolitik. Kissinger noted that Brandt 
was “the European statesman whose policy made [Nixon] most uneasy and whose personality 
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was perhaps most incompatible with his own.”287 Furthermore, Nixon believed that Brandt was 
deliberately trying to undermine the strength of the Atlantic Alliance because of his bias against 
the United States.288 With such uneasy relations and suspicions about the other, it is of little 
surprise that initial responses from West Germany were far from warm. In a telegram to the 
German Foreign Office, West German Ambassador to the US Berndt von Staden noted that 
Kissinger’s speech, while enthusiastically affirming the transatlantic alliance, fell far short of 
supporting European integration.289 Furthermore, Staden, like others in Europe, felt that the US 
was now trying to apply linkage to their dealings with Western Europe by announcing such a 
comprehensive plan for solving the problems in transatlantic relations.. Staden went on to note 
the speech reflected America’s “yearnings for the situation of the 1950s and 1960s . . . when the 
United States possessed undisputed supremacy, when Western Europe did not appear as a 
competitor, was accordingly dependent, and asked for little say in the matter but instead left the 
leadership role to the United States without question.”290 Staden’s critical appraisal of the 
Kissinger speech was reflective of the larger West German mentality. Just a week after the 
address, on May 1, Willy Brandt arrived in Washington to meet with President Nixon. In this 
meeting, the German chancellor took a sharp, matter-of-fact approach. He had an agenda that he 
was prepared to discuss, which he quickly moved through. To Kissinger, a participant in the 
meeting, Brandt appeared clear in his purpose—he had come to settle nothing in regard to 
transatlantic affairs.291 The German leader argued that he felt no need to discuss all of the broad 
issues that Kissinger had raised in his speech—a reference to the German disdain for an 
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American comprehensive strategy of linkage. Brandt was also careful to avoid mention of the 
Atlantic Charter Kissinger had proposed, an omission that the German press hailed as a success 
for the diplomacy of Brandt.292 Yet, most significant for the future of transatlantic relations and 
the Year of Europe was what Brandt had to say about the future of negotiations. He informed the 
president that the European heads of government no longer spoke merely as representatives of 
their own countries but also as representatives of the EC. He stated that he was not there “as the 
spokesman of Europe, but definitely as a spokesman for Europe.”293 The meaning was clear. 
Dealings with European leaders could no longer be as simple as they once were. The political 
implications of European integration were beginning to be felt in Washington. Ultimately, West 
Germany’s response to the Year of Europe speech reflected disagreement with the policy, and 
showed that the problems of alliance relations were not easily resolved. If any progress were to 
be made, it would have to happen between the two groups on the whole.  
Yet the Germans were far from the only European country to view the Year of Europe 
with hesitation; the French were intensely skeptical of the American initiative. Within the French 
government, the American proposals for comprehensive reevaluation of the Atlantic Alliance 
were viewed as an imperial effort to subordinate Europe, block the efforts of French leadership 
in the EC, share the burden of European defense without sharing any of the responsibilities, and 
to reincorporate France into NATO.294 Yet, the United States had developed a good relationship 
with the French president, and Nixon, Kissinger, and Pompidou all wanted to maintain the 
quality of their relationship. In a meeting in mid-May between Kissinger and Pompidou, the 
French president tackled the issue of deteriorating relations head on. He discussed some of the 
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concerns he had about the state of relations, particularly in regard to détente, but was much less 
concerned over Kissinger’s statement about global and regional interests than other European 
leaders had been. Despite having a constructive dialogue, little more than talk came from the 
meeting.295 Two weeks later, Nixon and Pompidou met in Reykjavik, Iceland to further discuss 
the Year of Europe. It was at that summit that tension would fully characterize the American-
French relationship. The night before the summit began, on May 30, Kissinger discussed the 
matter with the now French Foreign Minister, Michel Jobert. It was during that meeting that 
Kissinger realized the hopes he and Nixon had brought to Reykjavik were to be dashed. Jobert 
raised the points that Pompidou had not discussed during his conversations with Kissinger—the 
true concerns the government had about the Year of Europe. The French minister also accused 
the United States of using the summit as a move to gain political ground in the US-Soviet 
competition, since a meeting with Brezhnev was scheduled for a few weeks later.296 The meeting 
between Pompidou and Nixon would fare no better. Pompidou stated that “only the Americans 
could invoke a Year of Europe; For France, every year was the Year of Europe.”297 Pompidou 
also flatly rejected the idea of a new Atlantic Charter and further attempted to suggest strategies 
for consultation that he knew the British and Germans would not support, thus stalling the 
American initiative.298 The summit at Reykjavik ultimately ended with nothing but French 
refusal of every American proposal. 
What of the British, though? Surely America’s longtime ally with whom the Year of 
Europe began would be more supportive of the American overture to Europe than the other 
major powers had been. Initially, it appeared as if the British might in fact positively welcome 
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the American initiative. The Foreign Office issued a statement in which it acknowledged that the 
speech was certainly important and had been meant constructively by Kissinger. They noted that 
Her Majesty’s Government would study the issue further, and discuss it with their European 
allies, a move Kissinger interpreted to mean they were deferring to the French.299 In formulating 
a course of action, Cabinet Secretary Sir Burke Trend further analyzed the speech for Heath. 
Trend acknowledged that while the speech presented many positives, it also made some 
concerning statements about the subordination of European economic interests to American 
political interests and increased defense spending in NATO.300 Yet, Trend, a personal friend of 
Kissinger, recommended that Heath not rebuff the American proposal, since such actions might 
lead to a resurgence of American isolationism. Trend also recommended that the British only 
issue its support for an Atlantic Charter that was intentionally vague and broad, as it would be 
difficult for Europe on the whole to agree to anything specific.301 Heath resented the entire 
approach, though. In his memoirs, he criticized the very concept of a Year of Europe. “For Henry 
Kissinger to announce a Year of Europe without consulting any of us was rather like my standing 
between the lions in Trafalgar Square and announcing that we were embarking on a year to save 
America!”302 The discrepancy between Trend’s recommendations and Heath’s own disdain 
became apparent when Heath undertook his first effort to coordinate a response with the 
European allies in late-May through a meeting with Pompidou prior to the Reykjavik summit. 
The two statesmen determined that there was no need for a US-European summit to discuss an 
Atlantic Charter, and resolved to not rush into drafting any such document. Furthermore, the 
summit once again showed where Edward Heath’s true loyalties now stood—with Europe. At 
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many points in history, when a British prime minister spoke of Anglo-American relations and 
used the word “us” as Heath did recalling the Year of Europe, it would have referred to the 
United States and Great Britain; for Edward Heath, though, the “us” was almost always Europe. 
Thus after six weeks, and consultation with all of the major Atlantic players, Kissinger lacked 
support for a new Atlantic Charter and had received less than favorable response to the initiative 
on the whole. As Alistair Horne observes, “At the end of May, Kissinger’s earthshaking 
pronouncement on the Year of Europe had fallen a bit like the proverbial pregnant pole-
vaulter.”303 
With the Year of Europe quickly falling flat on its face, a result neither Kissinger nor 
Nixon anticipated, and with Watergate continuing to take attention away from the president’s 
foreign policy actions, the administration decided to take the next step. Since the Europeans had 
not submitted any draft of what a new Atlantic Charter might look like, Kissinger had the 
American version of the document drawn up; in fact, he had two different versions drafted—one 
long, complex State Department draft and a shorter, more contentious document prepared by his 
staff. When Michel Jobert arrived at San Clemente at the end of June, Kissinger gave him both 
drafts. Jobert refused to read them while at the meeting, but promised to read and study them, 
and if he found them acceptable, move the dialogue into a multilateral consultation with the 
EC.304 A few weeks later on July 12, Kissinger made a similar opening to the Germans by 
meeting with German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel. In that meeting, Kissinger asked Scheel to 
evaluate the two drafts and turn them into a formal declaration, which Scheel agreed to do within 
a few weeks.305 Meanwhile, the two drafts were sent to the British on July 8, but not before 
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Jobert had caused added strain to the Anglo-American relationship. In early July, before the 
drafts were sent to the British, Jobert had inquired of the government what they thought about 
the American drafts. When the British denied any knowledge of them, Jobert accused them of 
conspiring against France with the United States and claimed that surely the US had shared the 
documents with their special ally, Great Britain. Since the US had not yet sent the documents, 
Jobert’s stunt proved only to worsen already tense relations with the UK.306 The situation would 
further deteriorate, however, when Jobert informed Kissinger on July 16 that neither draft was 
acceptable. After the French rejection, the German foreign minister never returned the drafts.307 
Kissinger remained somewhat hopeful for a new Atlantic Charter and successful Year of 
Europe when the Nine gathered for a meeting in Copenhagen to discuss the American initiative 
on July 23—exactly three months after Kissinger’s speech. During their meeting, the EC foreign 
ministers discussed the previous bilateral communications that had occurred between the US and 
individual countries and acknowledged the need for multilateral consultation in the future. 
Concerning a draft statement on US-European relations, the ministerial council rejected the 
Nixon-Kissinger plan for an approved draft by September and a final communiqué that would be 
released at the conclusion of an Atlantic summit when Nixon visited Europe in November.308 
The driving force behind these objections was Jobert and the French government. Jobert favored 
not acting until 1974, but in the face of objections from the British and others, he compromised 
and agreed to allow the community’s political directors to draft a list of key principles and 
concerns for the ministers to consider when they met again in September.309 When the draft was 
completed, the Danish foreign minister—the chair of the foreign ministers’ council and EC 
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representative—would deliver the draft statement to the US, consider the American response to 
the draft, and relay the American thoughts to the rest of the ministers, at which point the process 
would begin again.310 Thus, the decisions of the EC foreign ministers appeared to “put the Year 
of Europe on ice for two more months.”311 From Nixon and Kissinger’s perspective, the only 
substantial product of the meeting was delay. 
The Copenhagen meeting had more severe consequences than just delay, however. 
Kissinger firmly believed that the European proceedings at Copenhagen could not have been 
more detrimental to the overall objectives of the Year of Europe. The EC ministers had turned 
“the European-American dialogue into an adversary proceeding.”312 Laying the blame at the feet 
of Michel Jobert, the United States felt as if the EC had taken “refuge in procedure.”313 The 
Europeans seemed more committed than ever to use the structure of the EC mechanisms to 
prevent any significant progress. Kissinger was irate over the entire situation. In a conversation 
with his long-time friend Sir Burke Trend, he expressed these thoughts most directly. He 
informed the British secretary that an antagonistic relationship was developing between the US 
and Europe, which would bring with it painful consequences. Furthermore, Kissinger felt that the 
Danish foreign minister—whose name he did not even know—was nothing more than a 
“messenger boy,” and that “the Europeans should not assume that the US Government would be 
prepared to negotiate with the Danish Foreign Minister.”314 The very act of negotiating with an 
unknown foreign minister “was totally incompatible with the relationship which the US had had 
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with the major European powers.”315 The United States was deeply resentful of the changes to 
communication this procedural approach represented. The extent to which this affected 
transatlantic dialogue was evident in a letter from Edward Heath to Richard Nixon on July 25. In 
it, Heath informed the president that, from now on, all bilateral communication between the US 
and individual EC member states would be shared among the entire Community. There would no 
longer be confidential bilateral discussions between the US and Europe.316 These challenges to 
communication seemed to doom everything Nixon and Kissinger had hoped to achieve. As 
Kissinger recalled, “Europe had responded to the Year of Europe initiative with a procedure in 
which those who talked with us were not empowered to negotiate while those who could have 
negotiated with us no longer had the authority to talk.”317 When the US realized full implications 
of the Copenhagen meeting, it abandoned all hope for the successful conclusion of its 
transatlantic initiative. In his meeting with Burke Trend, Kissinger bluntly stated, “The Year of 
Europe is over;” any additional progress would have to come from the Europeans.318  
 Britain’s new membership within the EC, the Year of Europe, and the subsequent 
European response all had profound implications for the special relationship. Just because Heath 
had achieved membership in the European Community, it did not mean his foreign policy focus 
could change; Europe was to remain his foremost consideration. Britain had undergone a 
reorientation of priorities. Heath was willing to sacrifice the special relationship if it meant the 
UK could become a leader in Europe. As a result, the new “cornerstone of his foreign policy 
concept” became Anglo-French relations, not Anglo-American relations.319 Heath had spent too 
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much time and effort convincing the French that the British were not an American “Trojan horse 
in the EC” to take any chances on the Year of Europe.320 As a result, the British premier made 
his move toward Europe. Heath revoked Burke Trend’s authority to consult with Washington 
bilaterally as early as April 1973, three months before the decision at Copenhagen.321 
Furthermore, in August, Heath made an overture to Brandt and Pompidou to hold a tripartite 
summit in which the three states would formulate a common European position.322 Heath kept 
moving closer to Europe and further away from the United States.   
These British moves were not lost on the Americans. When Nixon began the Year of 
Europe by meeting with Heath in January, the United States felt an air of mutual cooperation 
existed in which the British supported the American initiatives; by July, that feeling had 
dissipated, as even the British were increasingly viewed as adversaries. This new spirit regarding 
the special relationship is best demonstrated in two communications between the US and UK in 
late-July: a letter from Nixon to Heath and the aforementioned meeting between Kissinger and 
Trend. In a response to a letter from Heath about the results of the Copenhagen meeting, Nixon 
implied recent events seemed to negate the January agreement between the two nations on the 
importance of the Year of Europe for all parties in the Atlantic alliance. Furthermore, Nixon 
noted that he found the current debate in Europe “disturbing” and remarked that if he had 
mistakenly interpreted support from the other heads of government for the Year of Europe, he 
was willing to wash his hands of the matter, allowing the initiative to instead be handled in “the 
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routine channels and forums” as Heath recommended.323 The overall tone of Nixon’s letter was 
cool and slightly impersonal. There had been a marked change to the special relationship.  
Kissinger’s meeting with Trend was even more pointed than Nixon’s letter to Heath. 
While Trend was limited in what he could say as a result of the Copenhagen meeting, Kissinger 
spoke freely and directly. The results of the Copenhagen meeting and the procedure adopted had 
exposed fundamental problems in the nature of the special relationship as it stood. Kissinger, like 
Nixon, reiterated that the US had embarked upon the Year of Europe with the understanding that 
the British would support the initiative throughout. Instead, they found that the British had 
supported a “procedure [that] was incompatible with the sort of relationship the US had had with 
Britain in the past, as well as insulting—and the US Government had not even been consulted 
about the procedure.”324 Kissinger continued by noting that conversations with the British had 
never led the United States to conclude that Great Britain could not act without first consulting 
its allies. If prior consultation was needed, and Britain had informed the Americans of that, a 
change in British policy after speaking with the other eight members of the EC would have been 
acceptable to the United States. Instead, Kissinger believed that the British had been talking to 
him while making deals with the Europeans and not informing the US that any such inter-
European communications were even going on. No sharing of thoughts had occurred, and “the 
US resented this, especially from the British.”325 Kissinger believed the entire situation was 
unique. He informed Trend that “a new development in US relations with Britain” had occurred, 
in that “never before had there been failure at the beginning of a major initiative to keep each 
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other informed of their thinking.”326 Ultimately, the biggest issue for Kissinger was not that the 
British had taken a European view, but that they had refused to talk to the US about major 
substantive policies until they had first consulted Europe. This marked a significant change, and 
would “have major consequences for bilateral relations between the US and UK,” since “the US 
had never treated Britain as just another country.”327 Kissinger’s assessment of the special 
relationship was despairing. That the British could have devised policies without any 
consultation seemed inconceivable to Kissinger if the special relationship were still intact; 
instead, he felt that London’s policies had led to the relationship “hardly [being] ‘special’ any 
longer.”328 Perhaps Alistair Horne has best summarized the state of the special relationship by 
1973, writing that British policies, “had made a nonsense of the ‘special relationship’ which 
leaders going back to Churchill and Roosevelt, Kennedy and Macmillan had worked so hard to 
enshrine.”329  
The future of the Year of Europe was despairing. In August, the British again acted 
without consulting the US by submitting British drafts of an Atlantic Charter to NATO, further 
illustrating the divide between Europe and the United States and the deterioration of the special 
relationship.330 When the Nine finally met again in September 1973, they approved portions of a 
draft text written by Jobert, that were then sent to the US, which now-Secretary of State 
Kissinger regarded as nothing more than a copy of the EC declarations of 1972.331  
When the Yom Kippur War of 1973 broke out, tension further increased between the 
United States and Europe, as EC members resisted American efforts to broker a UN ceasefire 
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agreement. Aaron Spelling argues that the British, in particular, found itself in opposition for 
good reasons—namely its dependence on Arab oil.332  As relations between the allies spiraled 
further downward, 1973 ended without a declaration on Atlantic relations, but rather with the 
“Declaration on European Identity,” which appeared to the US a direct challenge to everything 
Kissinger had hoped to achieve in 1973. In response, Kissinger increased the direct confrontation 
of French efforts to steer the Nine away from the US with a counterproposal of his own.333 Yet 
as the oil crisis waged on, economic conditions worsened, and a meeting of the Nine in 
Copenhagen in late December failed to achieve any substantive progress on US-EC relations, the 
other eight states began to grow weary of French leadership. Ultimately, as Daniel Möckli, 
observes, “the political identity of the Nine was not strong enough to weather the double 
challenge of eroding economic solidarity and transatlantic confrontation.”334 Eventually, these 
economic and political factors would combine with governmental changes in Britain, France, and 
Germany to yield an Atlantic Charter in June 1974, but it was a charter far less significant than 
what Kissinger had hoped for. While many of the goals were eventually realized, the Year of 
Europe had failed, and had caused more conflict and disagreement than ever imagined.  
One must ask, however, what caused this failure? To Kissinger, the Year of Europe “had 
been drained of its moral and psychological significance by a year of bickering.”335 Europe’s 
negative response and concerted efforts to stall the American initiative through procedural 
mechanisms (which Kissinger genuinely believed was orchestrated by Michel Jobert) had made 
the failure inevitable by late-1973. Trouble for the Year of Europe was then further compounded 
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by the Middle East conflict in the Yom Kippur War, moves toward détente with the Soviet 
Union, and Watergate. The combination of challenges meant that the attempt for renewing 
transatlantic relations in 1973 was doomed.336 Yet, there was blame to be shared. As Andrew 
Scott observes, Kissinger was as much to blame for the initiative’s failure as the Europeans, if 
not more so. Kissinger had undertaken a major overhaul of transatlantic relations from within the 
office of national security advisor—a move he himself regarded as challenging—without ever 
consulting the foreign policy experts in the State Department and only providing scant plans to 
the allies in Europe.337 Furthermore, he failed to consider the full ramifications of the effort he 
had undertaken and what that meant for a newly united Europe. By continuing to advocate a 
bilateral approach to discussing issues that the Europeans perceived to be multilateral in scope, 
Kissinger inadvertently pushed Europe closer together, rather than pulling them closer to the 
United States.338 Another player, however, must be considered in the failure of the Year of 
Europe—Edward Heath. Heath’s firm resolve to join the EC led him to disregard and cast aside 
the special relationship. With America out, and Europe in, Heath attempted to further relations 
with Europe throughout 1973 by appealing to Britain’s Europeanism. Yet, as Katherine Hynes 
argues, he failed to gain the support of his fellow European leaders and in doing so failed to 
achieve his foreign policy goals while isolating his closest ally. By situating himself so clearly 
within Europe and disregarding the special relationship, Heath left the United States without 
support for the Year of Europe within the EC.339 Thus, European skepticism toward the 
American initiative, Kissinger’s own missteps in handling the initiative, and Edward Heath’s 
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failed move toward Europe all seemed to have doomed the Year of Europe from the start. In 
Kissinger’s own words, the Year of Europe ultimately became “the year that never was.”340 
                                                 




The Special Relationship by 1974 
 
 The years 1969–1973 were a turbulent period for American relations with Europe, and 
most specially the United Kingdom. As new questions concerning worldviews, geopolitical 
power and influence, European unity, and alliance relations emerged, there was bound to be an 
inevitable change in the way foreign policy was conducted. That change is clearly seen in the 
way European integration affected the special relationship. As the Nixon administration became 
increasingly cautious of a united Europe and the pro-European Heath continually moved closer 
to the continent, the special relationship changed in profound ways. The personal closeness that 
once characterized the interactions between American presidents and British prime ministers was 
replaced with a marked coolness and suspicion. The primacy that the special relationship was 
accorded in Britain was subjugated to closeness with Europe first and foremost. Consultation 
between the two states on all major policies, something that had long been an unquestioned 
practice, suddenly yielded to multiple channels of private communications that were not shared 
with each other. Kissinger eventually came to believe that the special relationship was “hardly 
special” anymore. 
 Yet for all of the strain placed on the relationship, it is important to note that it was not 
dead. Cooperation never ceased between the United States and Great Britain, particularly in 
areas of defense and nuclear security. Similarly, that such open and frank communications—like 
the one between Kissinger and Trend that seemed so critical of the special relationship—
continued to exist is proof that the United States still regarded Great Britain as its principal ally. 
The United States could not have spoken so freely and openly with many of its allies without 
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fear of adverse effects. Furthermore, the realities of the international situation by 1974 would 
spur the alliance and the special relationship into what Henry Kissinger called “one of the best 
periods of Atlantic cooperation in decades.”341 Divisions within Europe concerning the 
feasibility of European unity in the face of energy shortages, economic problems, and political 
deadlock left the British looking to renew its ties with the United States, having seen that a 
Europe led by France was not necessarily the best way forward. When confronted with what 
seemed like selfish ambition on the part of the French and the transatlantic connection stressed 
by the United States, the British went against the French.342 Furthermore, relations took another 
positive turn in February 1974 when Harold Wilson and the Labour party returned to power in 
the general elections. With Wilson came the “Eurosceptic and Washington friendly” Foreign 
Minister James Callaghan, who began to once again reach out to the United States to revive the 
special relationship.343 The relationship that had once seemed doomed now was by 1974 headed 
for revitalization. Had the relationship been completely dead, such revitalization would not have 
occurred. 
That the special relationship was improving by 1974, however, shows that it had in fact 
reached a dangerous state. Ultimately, one must ask what caused this deterioration in the first 
place. Who was to blame for the near end of the special relationship? Historians have long 
attempted to answer this question. For Niklas Rossbach, the answer to who was responsible for 
the demise is Henry Kissinger. Rossbach argues that Kissinger gradually took control of foreign 
policy power, and in doing so, began to use domestic distractions, such as Watergate, to advance 
policies that were fundamentally at odds with British policy, which he contends were aligned 
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closely to the policies of President Nixon himself.344 Others suggest that it was not Kissinger or 
Nixon, however, but the British who were to blame. Katherine Hynes’ arguments about Heath’s 
role in the Year of Europe failure extend to her analysis of the entire period. Over the course of 
political career, Heath had been converted to a full belief in the primacy of Europe. She argues 
that Heath’s failure to achieve his foreign policy goals isolated his closest ally. At the end of the 
day, Heath was to blame because even when the tactical purposes of European unity failed, 
Heath continued his pro-European orientation. Ultimately, Hynes concludes that, “Heath’s 
single-handed efforts to reorient British foreign policy amounted to nothing more than a curious 
anomaly in post-war history.”345 Yet still others reject the claim that it was personality or 
individual driven. Andrew Scott observes, “the course and shape of relations between London 
and Washington were determined overwhelmingly by the prevailing patterns of power, both 
nationally and globally.”346 For Scott, the decline of the special relationship was not the result of 
either individual, but rather the international political situation with which each country found 
itself grappling. As Piers Ludlow observes: 
When historians endeavour to understand why transatlantic relations became that much 
more turbulent during the Nixon/Kissinger period than they had been under Johnson, they 
should seek their answer not simply in the changed attitudes of the American government 
(vital though these undoubtedly were) but also in a radically different set of conditions in 
Western Europe. Nixon and his main foreign policy advisor were not just the architects of 
a new American policy towards Western Europe; they were also compelled to react to an 
alteration in Western Europe’s position, leadership and approach to the Cold War.347  
 
Thus, there are three major alternative interpretations of what brought about the decline of the 
special relationship. 
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 The question to be answered, however, is which interpretation is correct. The answer is 
all of them. What these three interpretations fail to see is the degree to which the special 
relationship declined in a complex arena. To narrow down the decline to a single notable cause is 
to deny the complexity of the situation. Furthermore, in an attempt to study the issue of Anglo-
American relations during this period in a broad light, these analyses fail to see the role 
European integration played within the decline. European integration is the vehicle that brought 
all of these factors together. The international climate was such that Nixon, Kissinger, and Heath 
all began to reevaluate their previous positions. That meant reassessing European unity. When 
the geopolitical climate led the Nixon administration to conclude unity was a threat, the 
intricacies of Kissinger and his style of diplomacy emerged within the foreign policy perspective. 
As Heath moved toward Europe out of what he perceived to be necessity, his stance on European 
integration inevitably alienated him from the United States. No other single foreign policy issue 
affecting the United States and Europe affected the special relationship in the way that European 
integration did, for in many ways, it was a totalizing change. Thus the effect of European 
integration on the special relationship was to expose the complex geopolitical and personal 
relationships of the early 1970s in such a way as to nearly destroy the longstanding closeness of 
the United States and Great Britain. 
For all of this talk of decline, one must ask what can be learned from the special 
relationship and the changes seen from 1973 to 1974; several important points emerge that will 
aid in one’s understanding of American relations with its allies. As Barbara Keys argues in her 
article “Henry Kissinger: The Emotional Statesman,” when dealing with international relations, 
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particularly during the Nixon-Kissinger years, personalities matter.348 Kissinger described 
Nixon’s relationship to Heath as “that of a jilted lover who has been told that friendship is 
possible, but who remembers the rejection rather than being inspired be the prospect.”349 He 
went on to state that despite having a personal affinity for Heath, he was “the most indifferent 
[British political leader] to the American connection and perhaps even Americans individually,” 
as well as the “most difficult British head of government we encountered.”350 Nixon and 
Kissinger, of course, were certainly unique personalities as well. Kissinger’s style of diplomacy 
was partially responsible for the failure of the year of Europe, while it was Nixon’s paranoia and 
secrecy that led to Watergate, ultimately ending his presidency prematurely. The combination of 
Heath and Nixon proved to yield a personality conflict that hindered relations. That personalities 
were involved in the quality of relations is evidence in that relations began to improve when 
Wilson was elected in February.351 The same can be said of other relationships between America 
and its allies. Those with whom leaders have closer personal relations tend to be closer allies.352  
Even more significantly than personality, however, is the understanding that America’s 
relations with its allies are affected by the individual states’ perceptions of their interests and 
broader geopolitical circumstances. The biggest reason the special relationship suffered and 
nearly collapsed in the years 1969—1973 was because both the United States and Great Britain 
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found themselves in situations beyond their control. In the United States, nuclear parity with the 
Soviet Union, the widely unpopular war in Vietnam, and economic challenges to the dollar 
(coupled with a more powerful European economy) combined to bring about change in 
American policies. No longer was a strong, economically and politically unified Europe 
advantageous for America. What had long been seen as a small price to pay for the greater good 
was now viewed as a large sacrifice for a change that threatened to undermine America’s very 
foundations in the Cold War contest. Meanwhile, economic struggles, commonwealth disputes, 
and political unrest at home forced the United Kingdom to reevaluate the path toward renewed 
international significance. In the search for global power, British leaders (both Labour and 
Conservative) realized that the best option for advancing Britain’s geopolitical interests was as a 
part of Europe, rather than as America’s most trusted ally. Thus, in many regards the domestic 
and international political climates were such that both the United States and Great Britain felt 
that they must act to preserve what they perceived to be their long-term interests, even if that 
meant alienating allies.353 This remains one of the fundamental tenets of American foreign policy 
and its handling of its relations with its allies. 
Thus, upon a final analysis, European integration had a profound impact on the special 
relationship. Changes within Europe occurred in a broader context of global change. As a result, 
American support for European unity decreased at the same time that British support increased. 
With the two states moving in opposite directions, it was only logical that relations would be 
negatively affected. These changes were further compounded by the emergence of some of the 
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most unique and complex personalities to ever lead the United States and Great Britain. When 
European integration brought geopolitics and personality together in a totalizing question of the 
future of each state in the global Cold War—essentially calling into question both domestic and 
foreign policy actions of the two states—Anglo-American relations rapidly deteriorated. When 
interpreted in this light and placed within a broader context, the period 1969–1973 is no longer 
an insignificant period. While certainly one of the lowest moments in the history of the special 
relationship, and often overshadowed by the relationships between Kennedy-Macmillan and 
Reagan-Thatcher, the Heath-Nixon relationship reveals much about the nature of the special 
relationship, and America’s relations with its allies more broadly. To simply dismiss the period 
under investigation as a low, insignificant moment in the history of Anglo-American relations is 
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